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Introduction 
 
 I am currently a UBFC-ISITE International Junior Fellow (associate professor) 
working in the Laboratoire d’Etude de l’Apprentissage et du Développement (LEAD) at 
l’Université de Bourgogne. I completed my B.A. in psychology with high honours and a 
minor in philosophy at the University of Saskatchewan in 2005. In my last years, I worked 
under the supervision of Prof. Jim Cheesman. I then completed my Master’s in 2007 and my 
Ph.D. in 2009 at the University of Waterloo under the supervision of Prof. Derek Besner. I 
then worked as a postdoctoral researcher at Ghent University under the supervision of Prof. 
Jan De Houwer. I currently reside in France, but I am a Canadian citizen. 
RULE I 
We are to admit no more causes of natural things than such as are 
both true and sufficient to explain their appearances. 
To this purpose the philosophers say that Nature does nothing in vain, 
and more is in vain when less will serve; for Nature is pleased with 
simplicity, and affects not the pomp of superfluous causes. 
– Isaac Newton, 1726 – 
 I am a cognitive psychologist with a background in learning, attention, and 
computational modelling. I believe strongly in the value of integrative research that seeks 
parsimony (ala the Newton, 1726/1846, quotation above) while exploring research across the 
sometimes arbitrary boundaries of paradigm-focused subfields. In that vein, my research 
interests have been rather scattered across different domains, but with common threads 
linking them together. 
 I have done considerable research on human contingency learning and evaluative 
learning. This work includes the development of the colour-word contingency learning 
paradigm, which is now used by numerous labs worldwide (e.g., Colin MacLeod, Céline 
Lemercier, Maria Augustinova, Nart Atalay, Joseph Tzelgov, Yoav Bar-Anan, Eliot Hazeltine, 
Toby Mordkoff, Chris Blais, etc.). My work in this domain has covered a variety of issues, 
including basic questions about how we learn to associate events in our environment to how 
we acquire likes and dislikes. This learning psychology research often intersects with my 
work in other domains where I have, for instance, considered the implications of learning 
principles on purported measures of attentional or executive control. 
 I also have a background in research on cognitive and attentional control, most notably 
in the conflict monitoring and task switching domains. In this research, I have investigated 
phenomena in the attentional and executive control domains, but through the lens of a 
learning perspective. In particular, certain phenomena (e.g., proportion congruent effects, 
switch costs, etc.) are typically presented as evidence for cognitive control. As I argue in my 
research, these effects can often alternatively be explained by much more basic learning 
processes, such as contingency learning, rhythmic responding biases, and feature binding. My 
general goal is to study human cognition through the perspective of a more broadly-focused 
memory framework (e.g., rather than appealing to very vague and task-specific “cognitive 
control” homunculi). 
 My work in the attention domain also links well with applied and developmental work 
at LEAD. For instance, Jean-Pierre Thibaut, Aurélia Bugaiska, and Robert French have done 
work on attentional processes in children and ageing populations (e.g., Bugaiska & Thibaut, 
2015; Clarys, Bugaiska, Tapia, & Baudouin, 2009; Thibaut, French, & Vezneva, 2010). Their 
expertise in developmental psychology combined with my experience in the cognitive control 
domain could thus result in interesting collaborations. For instance, many claims have been 
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made about attentional control over the lifespan using the paradigms that I frequently work 
with (e.g., Bugg, 2014b). My work would suggest that this past work may have actually been 
studying lower-level learning processes, and not cognitive control per se. Reinvestigation of 
these issues with better-controlled experiments (e.g., Schmidt, 2013a) might therefore result 
in new insights into development (Lemercier, Simoës-Perlant, Schmidt, & Boujon, 2017) and 
the origin and progression of psychological disorders (e.g., E. Abrahamse et al., 2016). 
 I also have expertise in computational modelling (e.g., neural networks). For instance, 
I programmed and work frequently with a Java-based neural network model that learns via 
episodic storage and retrieval (Schmidt, 2013a, 2013c, 2016a, 2016b, 2018; Schmidt, De 
Houwer, & Rothermund, 2016; Schmidt, Liefooghe, & De Houwer, 2017; Schmidt & 
Weissman, 2016). A major goal of this modelling project is to demonstrate how a few basic 
assumptions about how we store and retrieve episodic memories can have wide applicability 
across a range of research domains: skill acquisition, contingency learning, binding, timing, 
attentional control, and more. A key goal of mine is to further increase the breadth of scope of 
this neural network. For instance, sequential learning, action sequencing, and temporal 
perception are important aspects of human cognition that have yet to be explored in the PEP 
framework. Borrowing aspects of some of the models from my current lab, such as TRACX 
(French, Addyman, & Mareschal, 2011), PARSER (Perruchet & Vinter, 1998, 2002), and 
GAMIT (French, Addyman, Mareschal, & Thomas, 2014) could allow for one coherent 
framework that can learn regularities that occur in series across time. 
 I am a natural team player, having collaborated with scientists around the globe 
(France, Canada, Belgium, US, UK, Germany). I am also an excellent leader, as indicated by 
my numerous first-author publications. I further feel that I have worked hard to produce 
quality contributions to my field, rather than taking the easy road of publishing high-quantity 
incremental research. I feel that this has paid off: I have not only published frequently in high 
impact journals, but my novel contributions have had impact in the learning, attention, and 
cognitive control domains (e.g., over 1200 citations). I also have a strong record of securing 
external research funding. This includes Canada Graduate Scholarships (both Master’s and 
Doctoral) from the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada, a 
Postdoctoral Researcher Mandate (and renewal) from the Research Foundation – Flanders, 
and an International Junior Fellowship from the UBFC. I am highly motivated, passionate 
about science, and enthusiastic about future supervision of Ph.D. and Master’s students. 
 This thesis is divided into five chapters. The first chapter covers my research on the 
Stroop effect. The second chapter covers my research on human contingency learning, most 
notably my work with the colour-word contingency learning task (and variants thereof). The 
third chapter covers my research on attentional control, primarily my work critiquing the 
highly popular conflict monitoring account.  The forth chapter covers my research on neural 
network modelling, which is closely entwined with my experimental work discussed in the 
second and third chapters. The fifth and final chapter covers some miscellaneous research that 
does not fit as clearly in one of the above-mentioned categories. This work includes some 
work on pragmatics in formal reasoning, temporal learning, and task switching. 
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Published Work 
Brief background 
 Starting with research conducted as an undergraduate (licence), I have published a 
number of papers on the sources of conflict in Stroop and Stroop-like procedures. In the 
standard Stroop experiment (Stroop, 1935; for a review, see MacLeod, 1991), participants 
name the print colour of colour words (e.g., say “red” to the word “green” printed in red). The 
typical finding is that responses are slower and less accurate when the word and colour 
mismatch (e.g., “red” in green), termed an incongruent trial, relative to when the word and 
colour match (e.g., “red” in red), termed a congruent trial. Stroop, and related paradigms like 
the Eriksen flanker task (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974) and Simon task (Simon & Rudell, 1967), 
is interesting for a number of reasons. On the one hand, we are able to roughly follow the 
instruction to avoid reading the word and focus attention on the colour with a reasonably 
small error rate. On the other hand, the interference of the distracting word on colour 
identification indicates that, despite our best efforts, it is difficult to fully “filter out” the 
distracting word and attend exclusively to the colour. The Stroop effect therefore serves as a 
useful tool for studying cognition, how task-irrelevant information influences our behaviour, 
our ability (and limits on our ability) to control attention (e.g., see Chapter 3), and so on. 
Semantic Stroop 
 One key question in the Stroop literature is the source of the interference, which has 
been discussed extensively in the literature. Particular focus has been on whether the conflict 
between the word and colour occurs when selecting a potential response, termed response 
conflict, or whether conflict occurs between the meanings (i.e., semantic representations) of 
the word and colour, termed stimulus conflict. In Schmidt and Cheesman (2005), we used a 
procedure in which participants respond with key presses (rather than vocal responses), 
inspired by De Houwer (2003). Critically, two colours were mapped to each key (e.g., red or 
blue with the left key, and green or yellow with the right key). This design is illustrated in 
Figure 1.1. Using this 2-to-1 mapping procedure, it is possible to generate three trial types, 
which allow separate measures of stimulus and response conflict. On identity trials, the word 
is both congruent in meaning with the target colour and also corresponds to the same response 
(e.g., “blue” in blue). On same response trials, the word and colour are incongruent in 
meaning, but are mapped to the same response (e.g., “green” in blue). Thus, comparison of 
these two trial types gives a measure of stimulus conflict, as both trial types are equally 
response congruent but differ in whether the word and print colour correspond to the same 
colour concept. On different response trials, the word and colour differ both in meaning and 
in the response that they are mapped to (e.g., “red” in blue). Thus, same and different 
response trials differ only in response compatibility (i.e., both are different in meaning) and a 
difference between the two therefore is a measure of response conflict. 
 
Figure 1.1. 2-to-1 response mapping and the resulting three conditions. 
blue 
green 
red 
yellow 
F key 
J key 
Identity: blue 
Same Response: green 
Different Response: red 
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 We observed both stimulus and response conflict with colour words, as illustrated in 
Figure 1.2, which replicated previous findings from De Houwer (2003; see also, A. T. Chen, 
Bailey, Tiernan, & West, 2011, 2004; Hasshim & Parris, 2015; Jongen & Jonkman, 2008; van 
Veen & Carter, 2005). We were more interested, however, in Stroop effects for colour 
associates (e.g., “sky,” which is related in meaning to blue). Colour associates can also be 
congruent (e.g., “sky” in blue) or incongruent (e.g., “sky” in red) with the print colour, and 
this also produces a Stroop-like interference effect (W. R. Glaser & Glaser, 1989; Klein, 
1964; Mackinnon, Geiselman, & Woodward, 1985; Majeres, 1974; Posner & Snyder, 1975; 
Sharma & McKenna, 1998; Stirling, 1979). That is, incongruent colour associates are 
responded to more slowly and with more errors than congruent colour associates. 
 
 
Figure 1.2. Response time (left) and error rate (right) results of Schmidt and Cheesman 
(2005). 
 The compatibility difference evidenced using colour associate distracters has often 
been interpreted as being the result of early, semantic processes rather than late, response 
competition processes (W. R. Glaser & Glaser, 1989; Mackinnon et al., 1985; Stirling, 1979). 
The reason for interpreting the associate effect in this way is based on the following logic. 
The two stimulus dimensions are associatively related and the concurrent activation of the 
word and the target colour ought to produce stimulus conflict. On the other hand, there does 
not appear to be a direct relationship between the responses for the associate words and the 
colour responses. For instance, “sky” is not one of the potential responses. The response sets 
for the target and the distracter are distinct, and therefore no response conflict should be 
observed. Thus, associates are generally used as a means to present the argument that the 
Stroop effect results, in whole or in part, from early, semantic processes. 
 However, not all researchers accept the early, semantic account of the colour associate 
effect (Klein, 1964; Posner & Snyder, 1975). Klein suggested that associates may have their 
effect at output by indirectly producing the colour response linked to the colour associate. 
Thus, when “sky” is presented in the colour green, both blue and green are generated as 
potential responses and response competition results. According to this account then, 
associates should produce response conflict rather than stimulus conflict. Finally, Sharma and 
McKenna (1998; see also Majeres, 1974) argued that the effects of associates are located in 
the lexicon (rather than semantic memory) and emerge as a result of verbal responding. They 
observed a compatibility effect for colour associates using verbal responding to ink colour but 
the effect was eliminated when manual key press responses were used (but see Brown & 
Besner, 2001, for a re-analysis of these data). Sharma and McKenna concluded that the 
influence of colour associates in the Stroop task is restricted to lexical processing and will not 
be evident using manual responses because the verbal system does not control motor 
responses. As can be observed in Figure 1.2, however, colour associates did produce conflict 
in key press responses. Importantly, the colour associates produce only stimulus conflict, and 
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not response conflict, supporting the notion that associates only produce interference in 
semantics. 
Interlingual Stroop 
 In research on bilingualism, it is further observed that Stroop interference is found not 
only for the first language (L1), but also for words from a second language (L2; Altarriba & 
Mathis, 1997; Atalay & Misirlisoy, 2012; H. C. Chen & Ho, 1986; Dalrymple-Alford, 1968; 
Dyer, 1971; La Heij et al., 1990; Mägiste, 1984, 1985; Preston & Lambert, 1969; Smith & 
Kirsner, 1982; Tzelgov, Henik, & Leiser, 1990). For instance, a native English speaker that 
also speaks French will experience conflict from incongruent French colour words (e.g., 
“rouge” in blue). One thing that was less clear, however, is whether this L2 Stroop effect is 
due to stimulus conflict, response conflict, or both. Using the same 2-to-1 mapping procedure, 
we also observed that both stimulus and response conflict are observed in a foreign language 
(Schmidt, Hartsuiker, & De Houwer, 2018). In particular, Dutch speakers with relatively 
weak French skills produced both a stimulus and response conflict effect, both with native 
Dutch colour words and with second language French colour words, as illustrated in Figure 
1.3. Thus, even though French-language competency was not so high in the Flemish 
population, both stimulus and response interference were observed. 
 
Figure 1.3. Response time (left) and error (right) results from Schmidt, Hartsuiker, and De 
Houwer (2018). 
 This result contrasts with at least one prominent model in the language learning 
domain, called the revised hierarchical model. According to this model, early on in language 
learning foreign-language words are only learned as lexical translations of the native language 
equivalent words (Kroll & Stewart, 1994), as illustrated in Figure 1.4. According to this view, 
foreign language words are not directly connected to semantic knowledge. That is, we only 
learn a foreign language word (e.g., “jaune”) as a lexical translation of the same word in our 
first language (e.g., “yellow”). We do not learn a “direct” connection between the foreign 
language word and meaning (e.g., that “jaune” is related to canary, banana, etc.). If this were 
true, then we would not have expected a stimulus conflict effect. 
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Figure 1.4. Illustration of the Kroll and Stewart (1994) model. Note that second language 
words (L2) are only connected strongly to first language words (L1) in the lexicon and 
not to semantics. 
Response set and stimulus conflict 
 In Risko, Schmidt, and Besner (2006), we assessed colour associate Stroop effects 
again. In particular, we assessed the magnitude of congruency effects for colour associates 
that were associated either to colours in the response set (e.g., “sky,” if blue was one of the 
potential responses) or to colours out of the response set (e.g., “fire,” if red was not one of the 
potential responses). It was already known that out-of-set colour words produce less conflict 
than in-set colour words (e.g., Klein, 1964; Sharma & McKenna, 1998), but the same question 
was not assessed for colour associates. Interestingly, as observed in Figure 1.5, we observed 
larger congruency effects for in-set associates than for out-of-set associates in both key press 
and verbal task variants. These results suggest, at minimum, that colour associate congruency 
effects are related to responses in at least one way. Either colour associates do produce at least 
some response conflict (unfortunately, the 2-to-1 mapping procedure is impossible with out-
of-set associates) or in-set colours are primed by virtue of being potential responses. That is, 
out-of-set associates might produce less interference because they facilitate the semantic 
representation of a colour that is not primed as a potential response. 
 
Figure 1.5. Colour associate Stroop effects from Risko and colleagues (2006). 
Spreading activation versus lateral inhibition 
 In Schmidt, Cheesman, and Besner (2013), we noted a strange inconsistency in the 
way in which semantic connectivity is described in Stroop/conflict literatures and in the word 
reading literature. In the Stroop literature, conflict in meaning between two colours is 
described in terms of lateral inhibition (e.g., see Luo, 1999, for a semantic competition 
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account of Stroop effects). That is, a given concept (e.g., “red”) is proposed to “spread 
inhibition” to closely-related concepts (e.g., “blue”). This notion is in stark contrast to the way 
in which semantics are described in other literatures. For instance, consider the lexical 
decision task (Meyer & Schvaneveldt, 1971). On each trial in a lexical decision task, the 
participant is presented with a letter string that they have to judge as either being a word (e.g., 
“nurse”) or a nonword (e.g., “silmu”). One key finding in the lexical decision literature is 
semantic priming: if a prime word is presented in advance of the target word that is 
semantically related to the target (e.g., “doctor” as a prime to “nurse”), then performance is 
much better than when the prime word is unrelated in meaning to the target (e.g., “chair” as a 
prime to “nurse”). This priming effect has been interpreted in terms of spreading activation in 
semantics. That is, a given word (e.g., “nurse”) sends positive activation to closely-related 
concepts (e.g., “doctor”). This is obviously the exact opposite of lateral inhibition: following 
Stroop interference type logic, “nurse” should interfere with identification of the related 
concept “doctor.” Indeed, “word-word” variants of the Stroop task exist in which a distracting 
word is presented as a prime to a target word (e.g., M. O. Glaser & Glaser, 1982; W. R. 
Glaser & Glaser, 1989), very similar in procedure to a lexical decision task. Relatedly, even 
“category members” have been used in lexical decision experiments (Chiarello & Richards, 
1992), including occasional colour prime-probe pairs (e.g., Borowsky & Besner, 1991, 1993), 
and facilitation is again observed. 
 In a series of experiments, we explored what might explain these inconsistencies in 
theories (and results). First, we ruled out the notion that there is something special about 
colours (or categories more generally): incongruent colour associate word primes produced 
significantly faster responses to colour words in lexical decision than neutral word primes 
(i.e., the opposite of a Stroop effect). We found that interference is only observed when (a) the 
participant has to select between different colours (identification) and (b) there is a small 
repeating response set (i.e., only a few potential response options to choose from). In 
particular, we still observed that incongruent colour associates facilitated identification 
responses in a Stroop-like task when there was a very large, non-repeating set of associates 
and colour names. We also found facilitation of incongruent colour words on colour word 
targets with a very small set of stimuli in lexical decision. It was only in a fourth experiment 
with both (a) a small set of colour word targets and distracters, and (b) an identification 
response that we observed interference. 
 We interpreted these results as indicating that semantic concepts are linked positively 
(i.e., spreading activation) and that interference results from conflict in deciding on a potential 
response. For instance, the word “blue” and colour red suggest two different responses in a 
typical Stroop task and semantic facilitation between the concepts “blue” and “red,” perhaps 
unintuitively, make it even harder to determine which response is appropriate. This is because 
there are two highly primed response alternatives and it needs to be resolved which of the two 
is appropriate. In contrast, in lexical decision both “blue” and “red” are words and therefore 
hint at a “word” response. Facilitation between these related colours can only speed the 
“word” decision. These notions are illustrated visually in Figure 1.6. 
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Figure 1.6. Stimulus processing with facilitative semantic connections only in (a) lexical 
decision and (b) identification. Response codes can compete only if identification of 
the specific target is necessary. 
Stroop interference in development 
 In Lemercier, Simoës-Perlant, Schmidt, and Boujon (2017), we studied the magnitude 
of Stroop interference effects across a range of ages in children. Interestingly, we observed 
little variation in the magnitude of congruency effects from ages 6 to 18+. Prior findings have 
suggested that participants’ ability to resist interference increases with age (e.g., Bunge, 
Dudukovic, Thomason, Vaidya, & Gabrieli, 2002; Carver, Livesey, & Charles, 2001; Enns & 
Cameron, 1987; Pennequin, Nanty, & Khomsi, 2004; Rubia et al., 2000; Tipper, Bourque, 
Anderson, & Brehaut, 1989). As word reading becomes increasingly automatic with age, 
incongruent words gradually begin to interfere with colour naming (Gerstadt, Hong, & 
Diamond, 1994; MacLeod, 1991; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977; Schadler & Thissen, 1981). For 
instance, Schiller (1966) showed that the interference effect is minimal for children in first 
grade, maximal in second and third grade, and then progressively declines starting from fifth 
grade. These results were interpreted in the following way. When children are too young to 
read, word meaning does not interfere with colour naming. When their reading skills increase, 
word meaning interferes with colour naming. Further, it has also been argued that the 
inhibition mechanism is not yet mature at eight years old. As such, the magnitude of the 
interference effect is greater for young participants. With further development, suppression of 
the distracting word becomes more effective. This produces an inverted-U shaped function of 
interference across time, as illustrated in Figure 1.7. 
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Figure 1.7. An inverted-U shaped development of interference over age. As word reading 
ability increases in early childhood, incongruent words interfere more with colour 
naming. Later on in development, the ability to control attention and suppress the 
word increases, thereby diminishing interference in adolescence. 
 This hypothesis, related to a deficit in inhibitory control, has also been advanced to 
explain the increase in the magnitude of the interference effect in the elderly. It has been 
suggested that older people have more difficulty suppressing the to-be-ignored word 
dimension while processing the relevant colour dimension (Carter, Mintun, & Cohen, 1995; 
Comalli, Wapner, & Werner, 1962). However, a meta-analysis has demonstrated that the 
magnitude of the Stroop effect is in fact similar from young adulthood to old age when a 
general slowdown in processing is taken into account (Verhaeghen & Meersman, 1998). That 
is, elderly show a larger Stroop effect simply because they are overall slower to respond and 
the response time effect “scales up.” Bub, Masson, and Lalonde (2006) have also proposed a 
new explanation for the developmental variations in the Stroop effect starting from childhood. 
By studying the development of the Stroop effect from ages 5 to 12, they demonstrated that 
younger participants do not have more difficulty suppressing the irrelevant information, but 
have difficulty maintaining the coloured task set. The authors concluded that children 
maintain the colour-naming task set inconsistently across different trials. 
 A limitation with past research in this domain, however, was the way that incongruent 
and neutral items were tested. In particular, the neutral items were tested in separate blocks 
than the incongruent stimuli. There are several reasons why this is problematic. For instance, 
typical experiments use far less neutral stimuli (e.g., XXXX in each of five colours) than 
incongruent stimuli (e.g., 16 incongruent word-colour pairings) and this allows for item-
specific learning (i.e., automatization of each stimulus compound) in the former but not latter 
case (e.g., Lemercier, 2009). We therefore tested incongruent and neutral items in a mixed 
block. We observed that the congruency effect was actually quite stable across all participants 
when tested in this way. A further experiment with neutral items only and variable stimulus 
set sizes demonstrated clearly that it was the exploitation of smaller stimulus sets in older 
participants that gave the illusion of reduced Stroop effects during later development: neutral 
response times became faster with smaller stimulus sets. These results concur with other work 
in the musical Stroop domain (see Chapter 5 for more information) that have similarly raised 
questions about the “inverted U-shaped” interference notion (Grégoire, Perruchet, & Poulin-
Charronnat, 2015), where it has been observed that interference increases with music mastery 
and does not diminish again. 
Derived Stroop effects 
 In Liefooghe, Hughes, Schmidt, and De Houwer (in press), we aimed to train Stroop-
like effects with derived stimulus-stimulus relations. In particular, participants were first 
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given conditional discrimination training via matching-to-sample. In a matching-to-sample 
task, participants are given a sample (target) stimulus and two or more comparison (response) 
stimuli that they have to choose between. By rewarding selection of a given comparison 
stimulus on presentation of a given sample stimulus, learning of a relation between the sample 
and comparison is promoted. In our experiments, participants trained one set of nonwords 
with colours. For instance, participants are presented with the nonword “plesk” or “klamf” as 
a sample stimulus and need to select between the colour words “red” and “green” as 
comparison stimuli on the basis of the identity of the sample stimulus. For instance, 
participants may be reinforced via error feedback to select the comparison stimulus “red” 
when the sample stimulus is “plesk” and the comparison stimulus “green” when the sample 
stimulus is “klamf.” In a following matching-to-sample test without error feedback, the 
expectation is that participants will not only select the previously-reinforced colour word for 
each nonword (e.g., “red” to “plesk”), but also the reverse when the colour word is the sample 
and the nonwords are the comparison stimuli (e.g., “plesk” most often to “red”). 
 The same type of training was further extended to new sets of overlapping 
contingencies. For instance, “smelk” might be rewarded with selection of “plesk” and “gilpt” 
with selection of “klamf.” Conceptually, this creates two equivalence classes, one between 
“red,” “plesk,” and “smelk,” and another between “green,” “klamf,” and “gilpt.” That is, 
although “red” and “smelk” are never presented together, they share the same sample stimulus 
(“plesk”), and similarly for “green,” “gilpt,” and “klamf.” During a subsequent test phase in 
which no reinforcement is provided, responses in line with the contingencies that were 
previously reinforced (e.g., “klamf” → “green”) as well as reversed responding will be 
observed (e.g., “green” → “klamf”). In addition, when combining comparison stimuli of both 
sets of contingencies by using one set of comparison stimuli as sample stimuli (e.g., sample 
stimuli “red” and “green”) with comparison stimuli “gilpt” and “smelk,” the comparison 
stimulus “smelk” will be more likely selected when presenting the sample stimulus “red” and 
the comparison stimulus “gilpt” is more likely to be selected when presenting the sample 
stimulus “green.” The direct reinforcement of partially overlapping contingencies in the 
training phase thus results in the formation of several new relations which were never directly 
reinforced, namely: “red” → “smelk,” “smelk” → “red,” “green” → “gilpt,” and “gilpt” → 
“green.” This training procedure is illustrated in Figure 1.8. 
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Figure 1.8. Illustration of a conditional-discrimination training and test in Liefooghe and 
colleagues (in press). Solid arrows point towards the reinforced contingency during 
training. Dashed arrows point towards the expected response pattern during testing, 
without reinforcement. Besides responding in accordance to the directly reinforced 
contingencies, responses will also be based on derived relations, namely: reversed and 
transitive relations. 
 Our main question was then: can derived stimulus-stimulus relations like these induce 
automatic effects? As already described, with our conditional discrimination training two non-
words were directly reinforced with colours (i.e., reinforced associate), and two were only 
associated via derivation (i.e., derived associate). Following training, participants completed a 
modified Stroop task that included the colour words and their “associates” as distracters. Most 
critically, we were interested in whether derived associates produce a Stroop congruency 
effect. For instance, if “smelk” is the derived associate for “red,” then a congruent stimulus 
like “smelk” in red should be responded to faster and more accurately than an incongruent 
stimulus like “smelk” in green. In addition to expected learning of the relations (including 
derived relations) during conditional discrimination, in our Experiment 2 we also observed 
congruency effects for colour words, reinforced associates, and, more critically, derived 
associates, as illustrated in Figure 1.9. 
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Figure 1.9. RTs of Experiment 2 of Liefooghe and colleagues (in press) as a function of trial 
type and distracter type. Error bars denote the standard errors. Error rates (with 
standard errors) presented as text. 
 In further studies, we used the 2-to-1 mapping procedure described earlier in order to 
test whether the effect of reinforced and derived associates was due to stimulus conflict, 
response conflict or both. The results for our Experiment 4 are presented in Figure 1.10. As 
can be observed, only response conflict was observed for the directly-reinforced and derived 
associates. That is, there was a difference between same and different response trials, which 
are both (associatively) incongruent in meaning, but differ in the colour response associated 
with the word and colour. However, there is no difference (with moderate Bayesian evidence 
for the null) between identity and same response trials, which differ only in the (associatively-
trained) congruency in meaning. 
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Figure 1.10. RTs of Experiment 4 of Liefooghe and colleagues (in press) as a function of trial 
type and distracter type. Error bars denote the standard errors. Error rates (with 
standard errors) presented as text. 
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Works in Progress and Future Directions 
Language learning 
 In currently-ongoing research with my Ph.D. student, Iva Šaban (Šaban & Schmidt, 
2019), we are further extending the work that I started in Schmidt, Hartsuiker, and De 
Houwer (2018). As mentioned above, in our past work we studied stimulus and response 
conflict in Dutch-speaking students both in their native Dutch and in French. We found both 
response conflict and, more interestingly, stimulus conflict even for the L2 French colour 
words. In our language competence measures, however, the French level of the Dutch-
speaking sample was moderate. In line with the revised hierarchical model (Kroll & Stewart, 
1994), then, it might be proposed that participants were fluent enough in French to produce 
stimulus conflict. This model only assumes that direct connectivity of L2 words to the 
semantic store is weak in early language learning. Our suspicion, however, is that the notion 
that L2 words are not strongly linked to semantic knowledge early on is simply wrong (see 
also, Duyck & De Houwer, 2008). Thus, our follow-up work aims to assess stimulus conflict 
even earlier on in language learning. 
 We have already completed one study and have nearly finished a second. The 
completed experiment was almost identical to the Dutch-French study, except that the study 
was conducted in Dijon with the L1 language of French and L2 language of English. Our a 
priori assumption was that English-language competence in France would be notably worse 
than French-language competence in the Flemish region of Belgium. This turned out to be 
only partially true. L2 language competence was, as anticipated, lower in our new sample, but 
not substantially lower. Encouragingly, however, the results exactly replicated Schmidt, 
Hartsuiker, and De Houwer (2018): both stimulus and response conflict for L1 (French) and 
L2 (English) colour words. The data are presented in Figure 10.11. 
 
Figure 1.11. Response times with standard errors for French and English colour words from 
Experiment 1 of Šaban and Schmidt (2019). 
 Our second experiment pushes the same experimental logic to a further extreme. In 
particular, we are exploring whether stimulus conflict is observed in a completely unfamiliar 
language after a brief period of language training within the experiment. In particular, 
participants first learned four Croatian colour words. This was done in two initial phases. In 
the initial learning phase, participants were presented a Croatian colour word (“crvena” [red], 
“plava” [blue], “zelena” [green], or “siva” [grey]) along with its French (L1) translation 
(respectively, “rouge,” “bleu,” “vert,” and “gris”) on each trial. Participants were informed in 
advance that the words were Croatian and that they were to learn their meaning. Next, 
participants performed a matching phase, in which there were two types of trials. On some 
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trials, participants were presented with one of the Croatian colour words and they had to 
choose which of the four French colour words were the appropriate translation. On other 
trials, it was the reverse, where participants were presented a French colour word and had to 
choose the correct Croatian translation. In a final test phase, participants performed the same 
2-to-1 mapping Stroop task as in the previous experiments. Data collection is still ongoing, 
but we anticipate that a stimulus conflict effect should emerge in this experiment, even though 
the period of exposure to Croatian colour words was extremely short (approximately 10 
minutes).
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Published Work 
Brief background 
 One of the basic requirements of the human cognitive system, if not the most basic, is 
our ability to learn regularities between events in our environment (Allan, 2005; Beckers, De 
Houwer, & Matute, 2007; Shanks, 2010). Contingency learning is the basic building block for 
causal learning, knowledge acquisition, and the formation of the expectancies that make our 
world feel ordered rather than chaotic. For a short (scientific) encyclopedia article on human 
contingency learning, see Schmidt (2012). One of my main interests is the rules via which we 
learn contingent regularities, especially in the context of incidental learning. That is, I am 
interested in the progression of learning during a task in which it is not the express goal of the 
participant to learn. There are many variants of incidental learning paradigms. For instance, in 
implicit sequence learning, participants are tasked with responding to a target stimulus, but 
the series of stimuli and/or responses follow a predictable sequence (Nissen & Bullemer, 
1987). Learning of the sequence (e.g., as indicated by faster responses when the sequence is 
predictable rather than unpredictable) is therefore incidental to the main goal of simply 
responding to the stimulus of the current trial. My work takes a slightly different approach by 
having participants respond to target stimuli (e.g., print colours) while a “distracting” stimulus 
serves as a predictive cue. 
Colour-word contingency learning 
 In early work as a Master’s student, I introduced the colour-word contingency 
learning paradigm as a means to study incidental learning (Schmidt, Crump, Cheesman, & 
Besner, 2007; for related paradigms, see Carlson & Flowers, 1996; J. Miller, 1987; Mordkoff 
& Halterman, 2008; Musen & Squire, 1993). The structure of the task is similar to a colour-
word Stroop task (see Chapter 1) in some ways. On each trial, a participant is presented with a 
coloured word and asked to identify the print colour. The words are neutral (i.e., colour-
unrelated). The prototypical key manipulation, illustrated in Table 2.1, is that each neutral 
word is presented most often in one colour (e.g., “move” most often in blue). High 
contingency trials are those in which the word is presented in the expected colour (e.g., 
“move” in blue) and low contingency trials are those in which the word is presented in another 
colour (e.g., “move” in green). Learning of the contingencies is indicated by faster and more 
accurate responses to high relative to low contingency trials. Across multiple studies, we have 
now observed this learning effect robustly, with essentially every participant showing the 
expected effect in both response times and error rates. 
Table 2.1. Prototypical colour-word contingency learning manipulation. 
Colour 
Word 
move sent tell 
blue 8 1 1 
red 1 8 1 
green 1 1 8 
 Interestingly, these learning effects appear very quickly in the course of the 
experiment. As illustrated in Figure 2.1, the effect is already present within the first blocks of 
trials, and only increases moderately thereafter. This rapid acquisition is not unlike the 
learning observed in other learning procedures. In hidden covariation detection procedures, 
learning has been observed as quickly as after just one consistent pairing (Lewicki, 1985, 
1986; Lewicki, Hill, & Czyzewska, 1992). Similarly, learning of sequences is observed after 
very small training periods (Nissen & Bullemer, 1987). Also in the Hebb digit task, learning 
is rapid (Mckelvie, 1987). 
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Figure 2.1. Acquisition of contingencies across blocks as observed in Schmidt and colleagues 
(2007). 
 We also observed, as illustrated in Figure 2.2, that the contingency effect does not 
seem to be highly dependent on contingency awareness. While some participants may become 
explicitly aware of the contingencies in the task (subjectively aware) and others may be 
sensitive to the contingencies as indicated by above-chance guessing of which words went 
with which colours (objectively aware), the overall magnitude of the contingency effect does 
not seem to be heavily influenced by awareness. Aware participants were overall quicker 
(albeit with more errors), but contingency effects were roughly equivalent in size across 
awareness groups. 
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Figure 2.2. Contingency effect as a function of contingency awareness as observed in 
Schmidt and colleagues (2007). 
 We also observed that this learning effect is seemingly exclusively a stimulus-
response effect, rather than a stimulus-stimulus effect, as illustrated in Figure 2.3. In 
particular, using the same sort of 2-to-1 mapping manipulation described in the Stroop section 
of this thesis (Chapter 1), we found that participants responded faster to trials in which the 
word was presented in the expected colour (“stimulus match”) and equally faster when the 
word was presented in another colour associated to the same response (e.g., “move” in green, 
where move is presented infrequently in green, but the colour that “move” is presented in 
frequently is mapped to the same key as green). Responses were only slower when the word 
was printed in a colour mapped to a different response key. In other words, these results 
suggest that participants are learning which response to make (e.g., key to press) on the basis 
of the predictive stimulus (word) and are inconsistent with the notion that participants are 
learning associations (e.g., semantic) between words and colours. These findings are related 
to ongoing work (e.g., in language learning; see previous chapter) investigating when or with 
what kind of training a stimulus effect emerges. 
 
Figure 2.3. Response latencies in milliseconds according to trial type (stimulus match, 
response match, and response mismatch) from Experiment 4 of Schmidt and 
colleagues (2007). Percentage errors appear in brackets. 
Rapid acquisition 
 In subsequent reports, we have again observed that contingency effects emerge very 
rapidly. That is, already within the very first trials of the experiment, the difference in 
performance between high and low contingency trials is already observed (e.g., the first 18 
trials in Schmidt, De Houwer, & Besner, 2010), as illustrated in Figure 2.4. Interestingly, we 
also observed that once the contingency is removed (i.e., each word presented equally often in 
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all colours), unlearning of the previously trained contingency is quite rapid. In particular, 
Blocks 4-12 contained no contingency in the figure. Within a relatively small number of 
trials, the effect gets vanishingly small. We can still observe effects that persist over a number 
of trials, but these results seem to suggest that recency of stimulus pairings is especially 
important. 
 
Figure 2.4. High and low contingency response latencies in milliseconds as a function of 
block from Schmidt and colleagues (2010). 
 Similarly, if contingencies are reintroduced after an unlearning phase (even a 
relatively extended one), reacquisition of the contingency is almost immediate (Schmidt & De 
Houwer, 2016b). This is illustrated in Figure 2.5. After unlearning (grey), the contingency 
was reintroduced and the learning effect re-emerged quickly. In fact, learning is generally so 
rapid that it is difficult to study “rates” of learning: the effect is there and almost at a 
maximum right from the start. Said differently, the acquisition curve is so steep early on that 
it is hard to study the development of learning across trials. 
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Figure 2.5. High and low contingency response times from Schmidt and De Houwer (2016b) 
with standard errors for (a) long learning phase (short unlearning phase) and (b) short 
learning phase (long unlearning phase). Unlearning phase marked in grey. 
Awareness and instruction 
 Learning effects in the colour-word contingency learning procedure seem to be at least 
primarily implicit in nature. Participants oblivious to the contingency manipulation still show 
large and robust contingency effects. In most studies, we have not observed clear indications 
that contingency awareness even boosts the contingency effect. On the other hand, in a series 
of studies we explicitly told participants in advance what the high contingency pairings would 
be and asked them to remember these contingencies (Schmidt & De Houwer, 2012d). This did 
boost contingency effects, as shown in Figure 2.6. In a second study, we found that such 
instructions on their own were not enough to produce a “contingency effect.” That is, 
participants were told about contingencies that would supposedly exist between the words and 
colours, but in the following trials each word was actually presented equally often in all 
colours. Participants did not respond faster or more accurately to the instructed pairings. On 
the other hand, a third experiment did observe that false instructions can influence 
performance in another way. Participants were given instructions about the word-colour 
contingencies, but then during actual training a different contingency was present (e.g., a 
participant might be told that “month” would be presented most often in red, but it was 
actually presented most often in yellow). This did impair learning, as illustrated in Figure 2.7. 
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Figure 2.6. (a) response latencies and (b) error percentages as a function of contingency and 
instruction group from Experiment 1 of Schmidt and De Houwer (2012d). The bars 
represent standard errors. 
 
Figure 2.7. (a) response latencies and (b) error percentages as a function of contingency and 
instruction group in Experiment 3 of Schmidt and De Houwer (2012d). The bars 
represent standard errors. 
 Relatedly, in another study we told participants that there would be contingencies 
between words and colours, but not what the exact pairings would be (Schmidt & De Houwer, 
2012a). That is, they were told that one word would be presented most often in red, another 
most often in yellow, etc. Participants were asked to try to figure out the pairings. This, too, 
boosted contingency effects, as shown in Figure 2.8. Thus, at least in some cases, explicit 
awareness may increase learning. 
 
 
Figure 2.8. (a) response latencies and (b) error percentages as a function of contingency and 
instruction group in Schmidt and De Houwer (2012a). The bars represent standard 
errors. 
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 Although seemingly mostly incidental in nature, we have observed that working 
memory resources may be required to learn and use contingency knowledge (Schmidt et al., 
2010). In particular, participants were required to perform a secondary digit span task (i.e., 
remember some number of digits for a subsequent test of recognition), which could either be 
easy (2 digits) or hard (5 digits). The contingency effect is eliminated if participants had to do 
the hard digit span secondary task during either acquisition (i.e., learning phase) or test (i.e., 
contingency-absent test phase). 
Category-level learning 
 In other work (Schmidt, Augustinova, & De Houwer, 2018), we explored whether 
learning in this type of contingency task is exclusively based on individual items or whether 
learning could be more abstract in nature. Even though in past reports many different stimulus 
dimensions have been used for both the task-irrelevant distracter (e.g., shapes, words, 
nonwords, colours) and task-relevant target (e.g., colours, colour words, neutral words, 
positive/ negatively-valenced words) stimuli (Forrin & MacLeod, 2017; Levin & Tzelgov, 
2016; Schmidt & De Houwer, 2012b, 2012c), it was always the case that single, frequently 
repeated stimuli were the predictive stimuli (e.g., three words as predictive stimuli of 
colours). However, learning (particularly human) is often based on abstract information 
(Brady & Oliva, 2008; Emberson & Rubinstein, 2016). Using language, for instance, we can 
learn about conceptual relations without necessarily referring to specific stimuli. 
 We were therefore interested in exploring more “abstract,” category-level learning. In 
particular, we developed a variant of the colour-word contingency learning paradigm in which 
each word was presented once only in the task. However, each word (of which there were 
many) belonged to one of three categories (animals, professions, or verbs). Each category of 
words was presented most often in one colour (e.g., animals most often in blue). Thus, 
pretend that a participant is presented the word “rabbit” partway through the experiment. 
Though the participant had never been presented this word in the experiment before the 
current trial, many other animals were already presented in the task. Most of these animal 
names would have been presented in blue. Thus, while participants have not learned that 
“rabbit” predicts a blue response, they have learned that animal words predict a blue response. 
 Indeed, we observed category-level contingency effects: performance was better when 
the word was presented in the high contingency colour for the category (e.g., “rabbit” in blue) 
relative to another colour (e.g., “chicken” in red). The results of our Experiment 1 are 
presented in Figure 2.9. These effects were, however, notably smaller and less robust than in 
the standard colour-word contingency learning procedure, and emerged more clearly in the 
latter half of the experiment. From a memory perspective, this makes sense, as the specific 
stimuli (e.g., “doctor”) are new and only overlap in part (i.e., semantic association) with the 
stimuli used to establish the contingency (e.g., “nurse,” “firefighter,” etc.). Thus, there is a 
contingency, but it is a weak and indirect one. 
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Figure 2.9. Mean response times (left) and percentage errors (right) with standard errors by 
experiment half and contingency from Experiment 1 of Schmidt, Augustinova, and De 
Houwer (2018). 
Evaluative learning 
 In Schmidt and De Houwer (2012b), we developed a variant of an evaluative 
conditioning procedure based around the colour-word contingency learning procedure. 
Evaluative conditioning (see Hofmann, De Houwer, Perugini, Baeyens, & Crombez, 2010, for 
a review) refers to a change in liking of a stimulus that results from the pairing of that 
stimulus with another stimulus (De Houwer, 2007). In a typical evaluative condition (EC) 
procedure, a neutral conditioned stimulus (CS) is paired some number of times with a positive 
or negative unconditioned stimulus (US). For instance, in flavour conditioning, one neutral 
taste might be mixed with a pleasant taste and another neutral taste might be mixed with an 
unpleasant taste. After conditioning, the first neutral taste is typically rated more positively 
than the second. That is, the valence (positive vs. negative) of a US that a CS is paired with is 
transferred to the CS. Similarly, if one neutral picture is repeatedly presented along with a 
smiling face and another neutral picture is repeatedly presented with an angry face, then 
participants will subsequently rate the former neutral picture more positively than the latter. 
 In our task, we developed an implicit learning EC procedure. On each trial, the 
participant was presented with a prime nonword (e.g., “alsan”) and this was followed by 
either a positive or negative target word (e.g., “flowers” or “guns”). The task of the participant 
was to decide whether the target was positive or negative. Critically, some nonwords were 
presented most often with positive targets and other nonwords were presented most often with 
negative targets. Participants responded faster and more accurately to targets when the prime 
nonword was presented with the expected valence relative to the unexpected valence. In the 
first of two studies, a small set of positive and negative targets were used. Each of four 
nonwords was presented most often with one of these targets. In particular, we used the 2-to-1 
mapping procedure discussed in the chapter on the Stroop task (Chapter 1). That is, two target 
positive words were mapped to one key and two negative words were mapped to another key. 
This allowed us to assess stimulus match (identity) trials, where the nonword was presented 
with the expected target, valence match (same response) trials, where the nonword was 
presented with an unexpected target but of the same valence (e.g., “alsan” with “hug,” where 
“alsan” is normally presented with “flowers,” also positive), and valence mismatch (different 
response) trials, where the nonword is presented with a target of the unexpected valence. As 
illustrated in Figure 2.10, we observed faster response to stimulus and valence match trials 
relative to valence mismatch trials, with no difference between the former two conditions. 
This indicates that participants learned the nonword-valence contingencies, but not the 
nonword-target contingencies. This is similar to our above-mentioned findings with the non-
evaluative version of the task, where we observed that participants responded faster and more 
accurately to both “identity” and “same response” trials, with slower responses to “different 
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response” trials (Schmidt et al., 2007). This again indicates that learning seems to be 
exclusively (or primarily) stimulus-response based. 
 
Figure 2.10. Experiment 1 response latencies with standard errors and percentage errors for 
trial type and valence from Schmidt and De Houwer (2012b). 
 In a second experiment, we abandoned the 2-to-1 mapping procedure and used a large 
set of positive and negative target stimuli. Instead, nonwords were presented most often with 
all stimuli of one valence. For instance, “alsan” may have been presented frequently with all 
positive stimuli, and rarely with each negative stimulus. Thus, learning, if observed, is likely 
based on nonword-valence associations and not associations between a nonword and a 
particular target stimulus. As observed in Figure 2.11, this again produced a robust 
contingency learning effect. This indicates that learning is not exclusively determined by 
highly-repeated individual stimulus pairings (related to Schmidt, Augustinova, et al., 2018). 
In both experiments, we also assessed explicit ratings (the typical EC dependent measure) of 
the nonwords after training. That is, participants were asked to rate how much the liked each 
nonword. Nonwords that were presented frequently with positive targets were rated more 
positively than those presented frequently with negative targets. This rating effect was also 
highly correlated with the response time and error contingency effects. In Experiment 2, we 
also assessed contingency awareness. We observed that participants showed poor sensitivity 
to the contingencies in an objective awareness test. That is, they were guessing at around 
chance which nonwords were presented most often with positive stimuli and which were 
presented most often with negative stimuli. Few claimed subjective awareness. Response 
time, error, and rating contingency effects were not dependent on awareness, whether 
assessed on a subject or item level (see Baeyens, Eelen, & Van den Bergh, 1990; Pleyers, 
Corneille, Luminet, & Yzerbyt, 2007; Stahl & Unkelbach, 2009). That is, learning seemed to 
be primarily unconscious. 
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Figure 2.11. Experiment 2 response latencies with standard errors and percentage errors for 
contingency and valence from Schmidt and De Houwer (2012b). 
Temporal contiguity 
 In other work, we have explored to what extent contingency effects are dependent on 
the temporal contiguity (closeness in time) between the presentation of the predictive stimulus 
and the target stimulus (Schmidt & De Houwer, 2012c). Contingency (or covariation) 
learning is, of course, important. Since the advent of associationism in philosophy (e.g., 
Hume, 1739/1969), temporal contiguity between events has also been considered as one of 
the crucial factors in detecting the relationships between events (see Buehner, 2005, for a 
review). Early work on causal perception, for instance, shows that the perception that two 
events are causally related is strongest when the stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) between 
the potential cause and potential effect is very small and quickly weakens as the lag increases 
(e.g., Michotte, 1946/1963). Using a straightforward example, if you press a “mystery button” 
and a light in the room turns on almost immediately, then you are likely to attribute the light 
turning on to pressing the button. On the other hand, if nothing happens immediately after 
pressing the button, but the light turns on a minute later, you are not likely to attribute the 
button push as the cause of the light. 
 In our work, we used nonwords as the predictive stimuli and colour words as the target 
stimuli in a variant of the colour-word contingency learning task. In particular, we 
manipulated the onset of the predictive nonwords relative to the onset of the target colour 
words in a series of studies. In our first three studies, the distracter and target remained on the 
screen together, but onset at different SOAs. In Experiment 3, SOAs were negative, meaning 
that the distracter appeared after the target. In Experiment 4, presentation duration of the 
distracter was fixed and we manipulated the inter-stimulus interval (ISI), the time between the 
offset of the distracter and onset of the target. The results of these studies are presented in 
Figure 2.12. Globally, the results indicate that contingency effects are seemingly robust to a 
range of different temporal contiguities. That is, the contingency effect does not seem to vary 
in magnitude notably with a wide range of stimulus-onset asynchronies (SOAs) or inter-trial 
intervals (ITIs). 
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Figure 2.12. Mean response latencies and standard errors for high- and low-contingency trials 
as a function of stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) or inter-stimulus interval (ISI) for 
Experiments 1 (top left), 2 (top right), 3 (bottom left), and 4 (bottom right) of Schmidt 
and De Houwer (2012c). 
Item frequency 
 In other research (Schmidt & De Houwer, 2016a), we explored whether the 
contingency effect was due to facilitation for high contingency pairings, interference for low 
contingency pairings, or whether participants are simply responsive to individual stimulus-
response proportions (see also, Lin & MacLeod, 2018). That is, the response time (and error) 
difference between high contingency and low contingency stimuli could in principle be due to 
a number of different things. For instance, consider the example of “give” presented most 
often in purple. First, responses might be speeded to high contingency stimuli (e.g., “give” in 
purple). Additionally or alternatively, responses might be slowed to low contingency stimuli 
(e.g., “give” in orange, which is very infrequent). Relative to, for instance, a medium (chance) 
contingency word presented equally often in all colours, the benefit and/or the cost might be 
observed. 
 The frequency of word-colour combinations used in our Experiment 1 is presented in 
Table 2.2. Two of the words (e.g., “give” and “hear”) were presented most often (60% of the 
time) in one colour, very rarely (6.7%) in a second colour, and in an intermediate frequency 
(33.3%) in a third colour. The remaining word (e.g., “make”) was presented equally often 
(33.3%) in all three colours. These manipulations create five unique trial types. On high 
contingency trials (white in Table 2.2), the word is presented in its most frequent colour (e.g., 
“give” in purple). On low contingency trials (red in Table 2.2), the word is presented in its 
least frequent colour (e.g., “give” in orange). Critically, the manipulation allowed for three 
types of medium contingency trials. On biased-word trials (orange in Table 2.2), a word that 
is usually predictive of one high contingency response is presented in a medium contingency 
colour (e.g., “give” in grey, because “give” is normally presented in purple). On biased-
colour trials (blue in Table 2.2), the word is unpredictive of the correct response, but the 
colour is most often associated with a particular word (e.g., “make” in purple, given that 
purple is normally presented with “make”). Finally, on unbiased trials (green in Table 2.2), 
neither the word nor the colour is predictive of any other stimulus (e.g., “make” in grey). 
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Table 2.2. Adapted colour-word contingency learning manipulation from 
Experiment 1 of Schmidt and De Houwer (2016a). 
Colour 
Word 
give hear make 
purple 9 1 5 
orange 1 9 5 
grey 5 5 5 
 We considered four possible accounts of how contingency knowledge is retrieved and 
impacts responding. The first we called the prediction benefit account (e.g., Schmidt & 
Besner, 2008). According to this account, a response is anticipated if one of the potential 
responses is highly likely (e.g., greater than chance), and accurate response prediction benefits 
performance. As such, high contingency trials will be faster than all other trials. Critically, the 
prediction benefit account assumes that predicting a response does not impair the ability of 
the system to make any of the remaining responses (i.e., the predicted response does not 
compete with the non-predicted responses). Thus, there should be no costs for low 
contingency trials and resultantly no differences between the low, biased-word, biased-colour, 
and unbiased trial types. 
 Another contender we called the misprediction cost account. According to this 
account, if the distracting word is strongly predictive of one response, then (a) making that 
response will be facilitated (i.e., as in the prediction benefit account) and (b) making any other 
response will be impaired via response competition. That is, contingency information is used 
to activate the anticipated (i.e., high contingency) response and this activated response then 
competes with all other contending responses. Both low contingency and biased-word trials 
should be slowed by this sort of interference, whereas biased-colour and unbiased trials 
should not be. 
 A third possibility we called the bidirectional cost account, which is identical to the 
misprediction cost account, except that it is additionally assumed that it is harder to make a 
colour response that is frequently associated with a specific word that is not present on the 
current trial. For instance, if “give” is presented most often in purple, then participants might 
be hesitant to make a purple response if they do not see the (expected) word “give.” Thus, 
biased word, biased colour, and low contingency trials should be slowed relative to unbiased 
trials. 
 Finally, the fourth possibility we called the pure proportion account. Unlike the 
preceding three accounts, the pure proportion account suggests that response time will be 
determined by the proportion with which a given distracting word is presented with a given 
response. Thus, we should expect fast responses for the high contingency trials, slow 
responses for low contingency trials, and intermediate and similar response times for all three 
medium contingency conditions. As can be observed in Figure 2.13, it was this fourth pattern 
of results that we observed. 
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Figure 2.13. Mean response times (top) and percentage errors (bottom) with standard errors 
as a function of trial type from Experiment 1 of Schmidt and De Houwer (2016a). 
 Thus, Experiment 1 in Schmidt and De Houwer (2016a) seems to support the notion 
that response times simply speed up relative to the frequency of co-occurrence of a target and 
distracting stimulus. This might further imply that low contingency trials are not slowed down 
by virtue of their low frequency, but are rather sped up slightly by virtue of prior exposure 
(just not as much, of course, as more frequent pairings). As further support for this notion, we 
conducted a second experiment in which we compared responding to high contingency, low 
contingency, and once-presented novel word trials. Based on the proportion/frequency 
account discussed above, we predicted that low contingency trials would actually be 
responded to (slightly) faster than a novel word control. As observed in Figure 1.14, this is 
exactly what we observed. This account does, however, predict more errors for low 
contingency trials, which was also observed. 
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Figure 2.14. Mean response times (top) and percentage errors (bottom) with standard errors 
as a function of trial type from Experiment 2 of Schmidt and De Houwer (2016a). 
Cue competition and incidental learning 
 In a recent series of experiments, we explored whether cue competition effects can be 
observed during incidental learning (Schmidt & De Houwer, 2019), specifically, 
overshadowing and blocking. Overshadowing is the observation that when two stimuli, 
termed Stimulus A and Stimulus X, are presented together and followed by an outcome (i.e., 
AX+ trials), evidence for learning of the X-outcome relation is weaker compared to a 
condition in which only Stimulus X is paired with the outcome (i.e., X+ trials; Pavlov, 1927). 
For instance, rats can easily learn that a light or a tone predicts a food reward, but when a 
light and a tone are presented together with the reward, the rat may only weakly learn the 
individual light-food and tone-food relations. Thus, the light and tone “overshadowed” each 
other (or alternatively, one cue overshadows the other, but not the reverse). Blocking (Kamin, 
1969) is the observation that after learning that Stimulus A (e.g., light) predicts an outcome 
(e.g., food; A+), presentation of Stimulus A along with a new Stimulus X (e.g., tone) with the 
same outcome (food; i.e., AX+) weakens learning of the Stimulus X-outcome relation as 
compared to a condition with only AX+ trials (overshadowing). That is, even though Stimulus 
X and the outcome co-occurred during the compound AX learning phase, little learning of 
this regularity is observed. Thus, Stimulus A “blocks” learning about Stimulus X. 
 Several theoretical accounts of blocking and overshadowing have been presented over 
the years (e.g., Mackintosh, 1975; Pearce & Hall, 1980; Sutherland & Mackintosh, 1971). For 
instance, the Rescorla-Wagner model (Rescorla & Wagner, 1972) postulates that associative 
connections are only updated to the extent that an outcome was unexpected. This can account 
for blocking: the A-outcome association is learned early on, because the outcome is initially 
unexpected. When Stimulus A and Stimulus X are subsequently presented together with the 
same outcome (AX+), the outcome is already expected on the basis of the presence of 
Stimulus A. As a result, very little is learned about the Stimulus X-outcome relation. The 
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Rescorla-Wagner model can also account for overshadowing: the first time that A and X are 
presented together and followed by an outcome (AX+), the outcome is unexpected. Therefore, 
learning (i.e., association formation) occurs for both stimuli. On subsequent AX+ trials, 
however, both stimuli contribute to the prediction of the outcome, resulting in less prediction 
error and thus less strengthening of associations compared to a condition in which only X was 
present on all trials (X+; i.e., prediction error is lower with two predictive stimuli, weakening 
further learning for both; see R. R. Miller, Barnet, & Grahame, 1995). 
 It was less clear whether cue competition can be found in incidental learning tasks, 
that is, tasks in which predictive cues were not task relevant (targets). In most past reports, 
learning the contingency was the explicit goal and participants had ample time to reflect on 
the events that they saw (Chapman & Robbins, 1990; Dickinson, Shanks, & Evenden, 1984; 
Gluck & Bower, 1988; Le Pelley & McLaren, 2001). Thus, in our report we utilised the 
colour-word contingency learning paradigm for studying overshadowing and blocking. For 
the “Stimulus A” and “Stimulus X” we used neutral words and shapes (respectively or vice 
versa), with a target print colour. This allowed us to have: (a) word-only trials (coloured 
word, no shape), (b) shape-only trials (coloured shape, no word), and (c) compound stimulus 
trials (coloured word and shape). The procedure and example compound stimuli are presented 
in Figure 1.15. 
 
 
Figure 1.15. General trial procedure (top) and example compound stimuli (bottom) from 
Schmidt and De Houwer (2019). After a fixation cross and blank screen, a word-shape 
compound (or just a word or shape) is presented briefly in black, then changed to one 
of the target colours. 
 In an overshadowing experiment, participants were presented with compound words 
and shapes in colour (overshadowing) or with just coloured words (words-only) or just 
coloured shapes (shapes-only). Each word, shape, or word-shape compound was presented 
most often in one colour, as in the typical colour-word contingency learning paradigm. The 
results of this Experiment 1 are presented in Figure 1.16. Notably, overshadowing was not 
observed in the test phase. That is, there was a robust contingency effect for both words and 
shapes in the overshadowing condition, and these contingency effects for the individual words 
and shapes were not smaller than the contingency effects observed for stimuli trained alone 
(i.e., words in the words-only condition and shapes in the shapes-only condition). 
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Figure 1.16. Experiment 1 response time (left) and percentage error (right) contingency 
effects (low – high contingency) from Schmidt and De Houwer (2019) as a function of 
group and phase, with standard error bars. 
 In a second experiment, we tested for blocking. One group of participants were 
initially trained with coloured words only (words-first) and another group was initially trained 
with coloured shapes only (shapes-first). Both then proceeded to a compound cue training 
(i.e., coloured word-shape compounds). If blocking occurs, then we would expect larger 
contingency effects for the initially-trained dimension (e.g., shapes in the shapes-first 
condition) than for the “blocked” dimension (e.g., shapes in the words-first condition). We 
also included an overshadowing control group, who always saw compound word-shape 
stimuli. In addition, we assessed the intentionality of learning by instructing half of the 
participants in advance about the presence of contingencies, which they should intentionally 
try to learn. The results are presented in Figure 1.17. Notably, the non-instructed participants 
did not show blocking. The contingency effects for the “blocked” dimension were not smaller 
than the contingency effects for the “blocking” dimension. Instructed participants, however, 
did produce a blocking effect. Similar blocking effects were also observed in explicit 
judgements about the contingencies, which were robustly larger in instructed participants. 
Collectively, the results suggest that cue competition effects, like blocking and 
overshadowing, require explicit reasoning about the contingencies in the task. When learning 
is purely incidental and we test automatic influences of cue competition (e.g., in response 
times and errors), cue competition does not seem to be present. 
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Figure 1.17. Experiment 2 response time (top) and percentage error (bottom) contingency 
effects (low – high contingency) in Schmidt and De Houwer (2019) as a function of 
group and stimulus type during the test phase, with standard error bars. 
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Works in Progress and Future Directions 
Unitary mechanism of learning and binding 
 In two recent papers (Schmidt, Giesen, & Rothermund, 2018; Giesen, Schmidt, & 
Rothermund, 2019), we have been exploring whether contingency learning effects and 
shorter-term binding effects might be coherently explained by one mechanism. In addition to 
the learning of regularities across many events, our ability to bind our experiences into 
memory traces for later retrieval is also fundamental (Hommel, 1998, 2004; Hommel, 
Müsseler, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2001; Logan, 1988). Especially recent experiences can have 
a particularly potent influence on our behaviour (Grant & Logan, 1993). In the binding 
literature, researchers study the influence of recently-experienced events on performance. 
Although there are several variants of S-R binding (or feature integration) procedures 
(Hommel, 1998), consider the distracter-response binding paradigm (Frings, Rothermund, & 
Wentura, 2007; Rothermund, Wentura, & De Houwer, 2005). Participants respond to a target 
(e.g., print colour) while ignoring a distracter (e.g., word). Unlike a contingency learning 
experiment, the distracters are not correlated with targets/responses (e.g., each distracting 
word is presented equally often in all colours/with all responses). Instead, we assess 
performance on the second of two trials as a function of whether (a) the distracter repeats 
(e.g., “find” followed by “find”) or changes (e.g., “find” followed by “walk”), and (b) the 
target colour (and therefore response) repeats (e.g., blue followed by blue) or changes (e.g., 
blue followed by red). The standard finding is that when the (target) response repeats, 
participants are faster to respond when the distracter also repeats (sometimes termed a 
complete repetition), relative to when the distracter changes (partial response repetition). 
However, when the (target) response changes, participants are (a little) slower to respond 
when the distracter repeats (partial word repetition), relative to when the distracter and 
response both change (complete alternation). Globally, response repetitions are faster than 
response changes, but the Stimulus Relation × Response Relation interaction is most crucial. 
 We previously (Schmidt et al., 2016) made the argument that, at least in principle, 
these binding effects might be due to the same mechanism as contingency learning (see 
Chapter 4 for more information). In particular, we might think of the binding interaction as a 
short-term consequence of learning. For instance, if “find” was just presented in blue, then 
presentation of “find” again will bias another blue response, for a similar reason as why 
“find” would bias a blue response if it was presented frequently (rather than recently) in blue. 
This will speed us up if we do need to make a blue response, but slow us down if we need to 
make a different (e.g., red) response. Thus, binding effects could be regarded as a short-term 
consequence of learning (or, conversely, learning effects could be regarded as a long-term 
consequence of many bindings). 
 On the other hand, there could be more to binding effects than just short-term learning 
and there could be more to learning than just the accumulation of many bindings. In our 
recent papers, we have explored to what extent learning effects in the colour-word 
contingency learning procedure might be explained as a summation of many prior bindings. 
Globally, our results have indicated that, at minimum, contingency learning effects from the 
colour-word contingency learning paradigm are mostly accounted for by a summation of 
recent bindings in memory, providing some early support for the “unitary mechanism” view. 
Counterconditioning and habit formation 
 In other recent work (Schmidt, De Houwer, & Moors, 2018), we have been exploring 
whether contingencies do become more “stable” with extended practice. In some multiple day 
training studies, we explored how an overtrained contingency would be influenced by 
introduction of a new contingency. For instance, if “move” was presented most often in blue 
early on, then after two days of training “move” is suddenly presented most often in green, 
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would we still observe fast responses to “move” in blue, or would we observe that the “old” 
contingency is quickly erased and participants quickly learn the move-green contingency? 
Early results are mixed. In one experiment, there was some (albeit inconsistent) evidence that 
overtrained contingencies do seem to persist and learning of a new contingency seemed 
weaker. In subsequent studies, however, we found that both “overtrained” and “weakly 
trained” contingencies continue to influence participants during counterconditioning. That is, 
the contingency from early training continues to influence participants even after the 
contingency no longer applies, even for a contingency that was not trained for so long 
initially. We also observe acquisition of the new contingency as well. That is, relative to low 
contingency stimulus pairings that were never high contingency during the task, responding is 
facilitated for both the pairings consistent with initial (but no longer applicable) contingency 
and for the newly-introduced contingency. 
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Published Work 
Brief background 
 I have also conducted much research on the domain of cognitive and attentional 
control. In the attentional control literature, one particularly influential theory is known as the 
conflict monitoring or conflict adaptation account (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & 
Cohen, 2001). According to this theory, each time we experience conflict (e.g., an 
incongruent colour word in a Stroop task), control is upregulated and attention is directed 
away from distracting information (e.g., the word) and/or toward target information (e.g., the 
colour). This is to avoid further conflict. Relatedly, when conflict is low or not present (e.g., 
on a congruent trial), control is downregulated and attention is less focused on the target 
information. 
 There are two key phenomena that are frequently used to make the case for conflict 
monitoring. The first is the proportion congruent (PC) effect (Logan & Zbrodoff, 1979; 
Logan, Zbrodoff, & Williamson, 1984). The PC effect is the finding that the congruency 
effect (incongruent – congruent) is substantially reduced when most of the trials in the 
experiment are incongruent (e.g., 75% incongruent, 25% congruent) relative to when most of 
the trials are congruent (e.g., 75% congruent, 25% congruent). The typical pattern of results is 
presented in Figure 3.1. Although initial reports were interpreted in a very differently, the 
standard explanation of the PC effect is in terms of attentional control (e.g., Lowe & Mitterer, 
1982). In particular, it is argued that attentional control is stronger when most of the trials are 
incongruent, thereby reducing the influence of the distracting word on performance, as 
illustrated in Figure 3.1. The result is a smaller congruency effect. In contrast, when trials are 
mostly congruent, attentional control is weaker and the congruency effect is larger. Together, 
this produces an interaction between PC and congruency, which is referred to as the PC 
effect. 
 
Figure 3.1. Standard proportion congruent (PC) effect. The congruency effect is smaller 
when most trials are incongruent. 
 A second phenomenon used to make the case for attentional control is the congruency 
sequence effect (CSE), sometimes also called the Gratton effect, sequential congruency effect, 
or (conflating interpretation with behavioural effect) the conflict adaptation effect (Gratton, 
Coles, & Donchin, 1992). The CSE is the observation that the congruency effect is 
substantially reduced following an incongruent trial relative to a congruent trial. The typical 
finding is illustrated in Figure 3.2. Although initially interpreted in terms of expectancies, the 
CSE is typically interpreted in terms of conflict monitoring (e.g., Botvinick, Nystrom, Fissell, 
Carter, & Cohen, 1999). In particular, it is argued that after experiencing a conflicting 
incongruent trial, control is increased. Thus, attention to the distracter is diminished on the 
following trial, thereby reducing the congruency effect. In contrast, after a congruent trial 
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(where conflict is low or absent), control is diminished and the word has a larger impact on 
performance. 
 
Figure 3.2. Example congruency sequence effect. The congruency effect is smaller on the 
current trial if the previous trial was incongruent. 
 In my research, I have argued that evidence for conflict monitoring should be taken 
with caution. Both the PC and CSE effects are plagued with confounding factors unrelated to 
conflict or attention. Related to this, I have provided two literature reviews (Schmidt, 2013b, 
in press), in which I have outlined evidence against the conflict monitoring perspective. One 
of these is very recent, but also receiving attention rapidly. The older has already accumulated 
a large number of citations. In addition to these two review articles outlining evidence for or 
(mostly) against conflict monitoring, I was also the lead editor for a special issue on the topic 
(Schmidt, Notebaert, & Van den Bussche, 2015). 
Contingency learning confound and ISPC 
 In Schmidt and Besner (2008), we showed that the PC effect is confounded by simple 
stimulus-response contingency biases. In particular, we investigated the item-specific PC 
(ISPC) effect. Jacoby, Lindsay, and Hessels (2003) manipulated proportion congruency for 
each item (i.e., each colour word) such that some words were presented most often in their 
congruent colour (e.g., “blue” most often in blue) and other words were presented most often 
in a particular incongruent colour (e.g., “orange” most often in yellow). This design is 
illustrated in Table 3.1. A proportion congruent effect was still observed, even though high 
and low proportion congruent stimuli were intermixed in the same block of trials. As Jacoby 
and colleagues pointed out, this ISPC effect is difficult to accommodate within the conflict 
monitoring framework, because it would have to be assumed that participants are modulating 
attention to the word on a trial-by-trial basis depending on the identity of the word (e.g., if the 
word is BLUE, then the word is attended, but if the word is ORANGE, then the word is 
ignored). In essence, to defend the conflict monitoring account it would have to be maintained 
that participants decide whether to attend to the word after they have already read it. This is 
the position that has been taken by most (e.g., Blais, Robidoux, Risko, & Besner, 2007; 
Verguts & Notebaert, 2008). 
 
Table 3.1. Item-specific proportion congruent manipulation. 
Colour 
Word 
blue red yellow orange 
blue 3 1   
red 1 3   
yellow   1 3 
orange   3 1 
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 However, we pointed out that there is a simple stimulus-response contingency 
confound in this design, much comparable to the deliberately manipulated contingencies 
discussed in Chapter 2. For the mostly congruent stimuli (e.g., “blue”), each word is presented 
most often in the congruent colour (e.g., “blue” 75% of the time in blue) and very 
infrequently in each incongruent colour (e.g., “blue” only 25% of the time in red). Ignoring 
congruency altogether, this means that the word is strongly predictive of the likely response 
that needs to be made to the colour. This prediction will be correct on congruent trials (e.g., 
when “blue” is presented in blue, as expected), speeding responding, but incorrect on 
incongruent trials (e.g., when “blue” is presented in an unexpected colour, such as red). In the 
mostly incongruent condition, depending on the exact manipulation, the word is either 
unpredictive of the likely response (e.g., “blue” presented 25% of the time in blue, red, green, 
and yellow) or predictive of a specific incongruent response (e.g., “yellow” 75% of the time 
in orange and 25% in yellow, as in Table 3.1). This biases the congruency effect in the reverse 
direction. Note that this “contingency account” can explain the PC effect without making any 
assumptions about cognitive control, conflict, or attention. Instead, simple stimulus-response 
learning explains the interaction. This is illustrated in Figure 3.3. That is, there is a main 
effect of congruency and a main effect of contingency, but nothing else. 
 
Figure 3.3. Bottom: mean response latencies in milliseconds from Jacoby, Lindsay, and 
Hessels (2003) for congruent and incongruent trials with high, medium, and low 
contingencies, as reanalyzed by Schmidt and Besner (2008). Top: original 
organization of the data. Error data on the right. 
Further dissociation work 
 Subsequent research by myself and others has lent even more credence to the 
contingency account of the ISPC effect. For instance, if one separately manipulates 
contingency and attentional control biases using dissociation procedures (e.g., Hazeltine & 
Mordkoff, 2014; Schmidt, 2013a), very robust evidence of contingency learning biases are 
observed. No evidence for an additional attentional control contribution to the effect was 
observed. The manipulation from Experiment 1 of Schmidt (2013a) is illustrated in Table 3.2. 
Here, we again have two mostly congruent words (“blue” and “green”) and two mostly 
incongruent words (“red” and “yellow”). However, there are three types of incongruent trials. 
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In light grey are incongruent trials with a mostly congruent word that is low contingency (i.e., 
infrequent word-colour pair). In medium grey are incongruent trials with a mostly 
incongruent word that is also low contingency. These two trial types have an equal word-
colour contingency, but vary in PC. The conflict monitoring account would therefore predict 
slower responses to the former condition (i.e., more conflict from incongruent mostly 
congruent words). Finally, the dark grey cells are trials with a mostly incongruent word that is 
high contingency (i.e., frequent word-colour pairing). The contingency account would 
therefore predict faster responses to these mostly incongruent trials relative to the low 
contingency mostly incongruent trials. We therefore have a direct dissociation, with one 
measure of contingency learning and another measure of attentional control. 
 
Table 3.2. Modified ISPC manipulation in Schmidt (2013a). 
Colour 
Word 
blue green red yellow 
blue 7 1 1 1 
green 1 7 1 1 
red 1 1 1 7 
yellow 1 1 7 1 
 
 The results from Schmidt (2013a) are presented in Figure 3.4. As can be observed a 
very large and robust contingency learning effect is observed when comparing trials with 
equivalent PC (mostly incongruent) but differing contingencies (high vs. low). In contrast, 
there is no difference at all (with high power to detect an effect) between mostly congruent 
and mostly incongruent stimuli of equal contingencies. This, along with other results, strongly 
suggests that the ISPC effect is due to word-response contingency learning and not due to 
item-specific attentional control. 
 
Figure 3.4. Mean response times as a function of condition in Schmidt (2013a). There are 
mostly incongruent trials with high (left) and low (middle) contingencies and mostly 
congruent trials with low word-colour contingencies (right). Only evidence for a 
contingency effect is observed. 
Stimulus informativeness 
 In Schmidt (2014a), I presented the argument that it is important to match stimulus 
informativeness when studying the item-specific proportion congruent effect. While some 
studies, as described above, found exclusive evidence for contingency learning biases and no 
evidence for conflict monitoring in the ISPC, others have presented evidence seemingly 
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inconsistent with this. Most critically, Bugg and Hutchison (2013) argued that contingencies 
do dominate processing when words are strongly predictive of colours. However, if 
contingencies are weakened, conflict monitoring will take over as a “last resort” (see also, 
Bugg, 2014b; Bugg, Jacoby, & Chanani, 2011; Chiu, Jiang, & Egner, 2017). To achieve this, 
mostly incongruent words were presented equally often in many incongruent colours (e.g., 
“green” 25% of the time in each of the colours red, blue, and orange) rather than frequently in 
one incongruent colour (e.g., “green” 75% of the time in red). Mostly congruent words (rather 
by necessity) were nevertheless still presented frequently in one colour (i.e., the congruent 
colour). With this manipulation, results were seemingly consistent with a conflict monitoring 
account (mostly interference-driven effects) and inconsistent with a (simple) contingency 
learning account. 
 Comparing a contingent mostly congruent condition to a non-contingent mostly 
incongruent condition might produce results that seem harder to interpret from a contingency 
learning perspective, but this might also be like comparing apples to oranges. It is known that 
a contingency-laden dimension must be attended in order to learn the correlation (e.g., Jiang 
& Chun, 2001). More importantly, it is also known that when a contingency is detected for a 
given distracting stimulus, attention is attracted to this stimulus (e.g., Chun & Jian, 1998; 
Cosman & Vecera, 2014). The notion that contingent stimuli attract attention only stands to 
reason: predictive stimuli in our environment are attended because they can help guide our 
behaviour (see also, Hutcheon & Spieler, 2014). Thus, correlated mostly congruent distracting 
words should attract more attention than uncorrelated mostly incongruent words. Because of 
this, we should anticipate more attention to mostly congruent words than to mostly 
incongruent words in designs such as those from Bugg and Hutchison (2013), even without 
conflict monitoring. This account, of course, shares in common with the conflict monitoring 
account the notion that attention is better focused on the target in the mostly incongruent 
condition. However, the proposed reason why such an attentional difference exists is 
different. 
Temporal learning confound and LLPC 
 In other variants of the PC procedure, researchers have been interested in the PC of the 
task as a whole, rather than the effect for individual items (Cheesman & Merikle, 1986; M. O. 
Glaser & Glaser, 1982; Kane & Engle, 2003; Lindsay & Jacoby, 1994; Shor, 1975; West & 
Baylis, 1998). This I will refer to as the list-level PC (LLPC) effect. Typically, LLPC is 
assessed by manipulating the PC of the list (e.g., averaged across all items for one group of 
participants or block of trials) with some biased (or inducer) items. For instance, “blue” and 
“red” might be mostly congruent (e.g., “blue” most often in blue) in one condition and mostly 
incongruent (e.g., “blue” most often in red) in another condition. Intermixed with these biased 
items are some other transfer (or diagnostic) items that are non-manipulated. For instance, 
“green” and “brown” might be presented equally often in green and brown for all participants 
(i.e., the same congruent:incongruent ratio in both PC conditions). It is the PC effect for these 
transfer items that we term the LLPC effect. 
 Notably, a LLPC effect cannot be explained by contingency learning (as the transfer 
items are contingency-unbiased), but could, in principle, be explained by transfer of control 
from the manipulated items to the transfer items. That is, because conflict is overall more 
frequent in the mostly incongruent condition, attention is minimized to all distracting words, 
including those that were not directly manipulated. Some of the first, most straightforward 
manipulations of LLPC produced no effect (Blais & Bunge, 2010; Bugg, Jacoby, & Toth, 
2008). That is, the congruency effect for transfer items was exactly the same in the mostly 
congruent and mostly incongruent lists. However, later reports have observed effects in a 
variety of tasks (e.g., Stroop, Simon, picture-word, prime-probe; Bugg, 2014a; Bugg & 
Chanani, 2011; Bugg, McDaniel, Scullin, & Braver, 2011; Gonthier, Braver, & Bugg, 2016; 
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Hutchison, 2011; Schmidt, 2017), including across tasks (Funes, Lupiáñez, & Humphreys, 
2010; Torres-Quesada, Funes, & Lupiáñez, 2013; Wühr, Duthoo, & Notebaert, 2015). 
 However, there remains another account of LLPC effects. Schmidt (2013c) first 
presented the notion that the LLPC effect might be due, wholly or in part, to temporal 
learning biases (for a related idea in masked priming, see Kinoshita, Mozer, & Forster, 2011). 
The idea is not necessarily easy to grasp if one is used to thinking about the content of the 
items we manipulate (e.g., congruent vs. incongruent, high vs. low frequency, etc.). However, 
many times more systematic variance in response times is explained by how we time our 
responses than the factors themselves (see Grosjean, Rosenbaum, & Elsinger, 2001). In 
particular, we are highly biased to time our responses in a rhythmic way. That is, my response 
time (RT) on the current trial will tend to be highly similar to my RTs on very recent trials. 
This systematic variability in response times can be observed in pink noise (also referred to as 
1/f or flicker noise): ignoring some random “white” noise and systematic effects of factors, 
current RT is likely to be increasingly less similar to a given prior RT the further back in time 
it occurred. These autocorrelations in RTs are omnipresent in a broad range of cognitive 
paradigms, including mental rotation, lexical decision, visual search, and speeded 
classification (Gilden, 1997, 2001). It has been repeatedly observed in a number of domains 
that timing biases produce interactive effects between study factors that have relatively little 
to do with the factor manipulations themselves (Kinoshita, Forster, & Mozer, 2008; Kinoshita 
& Lupker, 2003; Kinoshita et al., 2011; Lupker, Brown, & Colombo, 1997; Mozer, Kinoshita, 
& Davis, 2004; Schmidt, 2014c, 2016c). Indeed, Kiger and Glass (1981; see also, Kinoshita et 
al., 2011) stress that such decision-related (rather than content-related) effects “will continue 
to be rediscovered in many circumstances... and will be mistakenly attributed to a multiplicity 
of causes” (p. 697). 
 Rhythmic timing biases can produce a LLPC effect because such biases can affect 
congruent and incongruent trial types differentially in conditions with a faster versus slower 
task pace. Naturally, the task pace in a mostly congruent list will be much faster than in a 
mostly incongruent list (i.e., more fast congruent trials in the former). Schmidt (2013c) argued 
that timing biases will benefit response speed selectively for trials in which participants have 
sufficient evidence to select a response at the expected time. A simplified illustration is 
presented in Figure 3.5. In particular, the threshold for selecting a response is decreased (i.e., 
the trigger to respond is loosened) at the expected time, allowing for faster responses if the 
task pace can be maintained (i.e., if there is sufficient evidence to cross the temporarily-
decreased threshold). When the task pace is fast (e.g., mostly congruent), congruent trials will 
tend to benefit from temporal expectancies. That is, participants will have enough evidence to 
select a response at the expected time and maintain their task pace. For the occasional 
incongruent trial, however, there will typically not be enough evidence for a response at the 
expected time (e.g., due to ongoing resolution of conflict), and responding will therefore be 
delayed. The net effect is an inflated congruency effect. In the mostly incongruent condition, 
the situation is largely reversed. The task pace is slower and an early response is therefore not 
expected. Expectancy for a later response might therefore benefit incongruent trials. The 
occasional congruent trials, however, do not benefit in the same way as in the mostly 
congruent condition. The net effect is a smaller congruency effect. 
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Figure 3.5. Simplified illustration of how temporal expectancies can produce a LLPC effect. 
Notes: dotted line = response threshold, slopes indicate rate of evidence accumulation 
for the correct response. 
 To test this notion, previous trial RT was used as a rough proxy for “pace,” with the 
prediction that the congruency effect should be overall larger the faster the previous RT 
(Schmidt, 2013c). In a linear mixed effects (LME) regression on LLPC data from Hutchison 
(2011), this exact finding was observed. That is, the faster the previous trial RT, the larger the 
congruency effect on the current trial. Additionally, accounting for this timing bias reduced 
the LLPC effect. Although a suboptimal measure of rhythmic timing on its own, these results 
lend credence to the notion that temporal learning, at minimum, is likely to contribute to the 
LLPC effect. Subsequent work (described below) adds further support to this notion. 
Non-conflict temporal learning effects 
 In addition to the LME data discussed above and some neural network modelling data 
(see Chapter 4), I also tested the notion that a LLPC like interaction should be observed even 
without a manipulation of conflict. For instance, in Schmidt (2013c) I used a simple letter 
identification task. On each trial, participants saw only a letter (D, F, J, or K) and were simply 
required to press the corresponding key on the keyboard. Unlike a conflict task (e.g., Stroop), 
there were no distracting stimuli and thus no conflict. The only manipulations were the 
contrast of the target digit on a given trial (high vs. low) and the proportion of high versus low 
contrast trials (mostly easy vs. mostly hard). Of course, participants respond faster to high 
contrast (easy to see) targets than to low contrast (slightly harder to see) targets, but this 
contrast effect was also moderated by proportion easy. Just like a LLPC effect, the contrast 
effect was larger in the mostly easy context relative to the mostly hard context. This is exactly 
what one would expect on the basis of the temporal learning account: conflict is not relevant, 
only the pace, and the pace is faster in the mostly easy condition. The conflict monitoring 
account, of course, cannot explain this finding: there is no conflict to monitor or adjust to. 
Schmidt (2014c) further confirmed that this proportion easy effect is not specific to items by 
using the same sort of biased/transfer item design as described earlier for the LLPC 
procedure. The data from Experiment 1 are presented in Figure 3.6. What these results 
illustrate is a relatively pure example of why we should expect a PC-like interaction in a 
LLPC procedure even without conflict monitoring. 
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Figure 3.6. Experiment 1 response latencies in milliseconds from Schmidt (2014c) for 
contrast, proportion easy, and item type, with standard error bars. 
Further dissociation work 
 In a recent series of experiments, I aimed to more clearly adjudicate between a pure 
temporal learning view and conflict monitoring. In this even more compelling approach, I 
aimed to eliminate temporal learning biases in the LLPC effect by directly manipulating task 
pace (Schmidt, 2017). In particular, prime-probe conflict tasks with direction word distracters 
and targets were used in place of colour-word Stroop. Distracting location words (e.g., “left”) 
are presented as primes to target probe words (e.g., “right”), which can be congruent or 
incongruent (essentially word-word direction Stroop). The typical LLPC design was used. 
That is, some biased words (e.g., “up” and “down”) were manipulated for PC and some 
intermixed transfer items (e.g., “left” and “right”) were not manipulated, as illustrated in 
Figure 3.7. In a control condition, this produced a robust LLPC effect. In the critical “long 
wait” condition, however, task pace was manipulated by presenting “wait cues” on some of 
the biased item trials. Participants had to wait for a brief amount of time (until the cue 
disappeared) before making a response. This, at least roughly, served to match response speed 
and accuracy in the mostly congruent and mostly incongruent conditions. This eliminated the 
LLPC effect, as shown in Figure 3.8. Note that in the control (short wait) condition, the same 
wait cues were presented but more briefly. These experiments provided a clear dissociation 
between the pure temporal learning and control views. According to the temporal learning 
account, only the pace of responding matters. Thus, the LLPC effect should be eliminated. 
According to the conflict monitoring view, however, conflict matters. The long wait 
manipulation preserved the conflict proportions, so a LLPC effect still should have been 
observed. 
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Figure 3.7. Experiment 1 trial procedure from Schmidt (2017) for diagnostic (and biased) 
items and inducer items. 
 
Figure 3.8. Experiment 1 response times (top) and percentage errors (bottom) from Schmidt 
(2017) for short and long wait diagnostic items. 
Context-specific proportion congruency 
 Another line of evidence for conflict monitoring comes from context-specific 
proportion congruent (CSPC) effects (Bugg et al., 2008; Corballis & Gratton, 2003; Crump, 
Gong, & Milliken, 2006; Crump, Vaquero, & Milliken, 2008; Heinemann, Kunde, & Kiesel, 
2009; Lehle & Hubner, 2008; Wendt & Kiesel, 2011). A CSPC procedure typically involves 
two contexts, such as two stimulus display locations (e.g., above or below fixation) or fonts. 
The same (randomly intermixed) stimuli are mostly congruent in one context (e.g., above 
fixation) and most incongruent in the other context (e.g., below fixation). The CSPC effect is 
the observation that the congruency effect is smaller in the latter context relative to the 
former. One thing that is particularly interesting about CSPC effects is that mostly congruent 
and mostly incongruent stimuli are randomly intermixed. Thus, at the start of the trial, the 
participant has no knowledge of whether the upcoming stimulus will be mostly congruent or 
mostly incongruent. Thus, if attention is really being controlled, then the control signal 
cannot, by definition, be triggered until the stimulus context (e.g., location) has already been 
observed. Given that the target stimulus is presented concurrently with the context, this means 
that there is zero advanced preparation time to adjust attention. It has nevertheless been 
Chapter 3 – Attentional Control  63 
proposed that attentional control is quickly engaged from stimulus onset, with an upregulation 
of attentional control for the mostly incongruent context and a downregulation for the mostly 
congruent context. 
 An alternative view is that CSPC effects, in whole or in part, are due to contingency 
learning (Schmidt & Lemercier, 2019), just like with the ISPC effect discussed above. An 
example CSPC design is illustrated in Table 3.3. What will be noted is that, task-wide, words 
are only moderately predictive of the congruent colour. Also, as each word is presented in 
both the mostly congruent and mostly incongruent contexts, the word-colour contingencies 
alone cannot explain CSPC effects. However, if we make the reasonable assumption that 
participants can combine location and word information together to anticipate the likely 
response (e.g., see Mordkoff & Halterman, 2008; see also, Holland, 1992, for a background 
on occasion setting), then the word + location is, in fact, strongly predictive of the congruent 
response in the mostly congruent condition (e.g., “green” + up indicates a likely green 
response), and unpredictive in the mostly incongruent condition (e.g., “green” + down is 
uninformative about the likely colour response). Thus, compound-stimulus contingency 
learning can potentially explain the CSPC effect. 
Table 3.3. Example context-specific proportion congruent manipulation. 
  Up   Down  
Colour brown blue green red brown blue green red 
brown 9 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 
blue 1 9 1 1 3 3 3 3 
green 1 1 9 1 3 3 3 3 
red 1 1 1 9 3 3 3 3 
 In our studies, we made use of the font version of the CSPC paradigm. This is 
identical to the location-based CSPC design described above, except that the font in which 
coloured colour words were presented served as the contextual cue (Bugg et al., 2008). In 
order to dissociate between contingency and attentional control biases, we used a slightly 
modified stimulus matrix, illustrated in Table 3.4. As you will notice, two words are mostly 
congruent (MC) in one font and mostly incongruent (MI) in the other font. For the remaining 
two words, this was reversed. Most importantly, high contingency (HC) and low contingency 
(LC) trials are not, however, completely confounded with proportion congruency in this novel 
design, at least for incongruent items. 
Table 3.4. Experiment 1 contingency manipulation from Schmidt and Lemercier (2019). 
  italic Georgia   roman Arial  
Colour brown blue green red brown blue green red 
brown 9 1 1 1 1 9 1 1 
blue 1 9 1 1 9 1 1 1 
green 1 1 1 9 1 1 9 1 
red 1 1 9 1 1 1 1 9 
Notes: light grey = HC/MI, mid grey = LC/MI, dark grey = LC/MC, white = congruent 
 Most critical to this design is that it produces three types of incongruent trials. First, 
there are high contingency, mostly incongruent (HC/MI) trials (e.g., “brown” in blue in Arial 
font; light grey in Table 3.4), which have a strong contingency bias toward the correct 
response. Next, there are low contingency, mostly incongruent (LC/MI) trials (e.g., “red” in 
blue in Georgia font; mid grey in Table 3.4), which are also mostly incongruent, but low 
contingency. Thus, a difference between HC/MI and LC/MI trials cannot indicate conflict 
adaptation (as the words are equally mostly incongruent), and must therefore indicate a 
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contingency learning effect (i.e., high contingency < low contingency). Finally, there are low 
contingency, mostly congruent (LC/MC) trials (e.g., “green” in blue in Arial font; dark grey in 
Table 3.4). Like the LC/MI trials, these are also low contingency, but are mostly congruent. 
As such, a difference in performance between LC/MI and LC/MC conditions cannot indicate 
a contingency learning bias, but could indicate an attentional control effect (mostly 
incongruent < mostly congruent). As can be observed in Figure 3.9, a robust contingency 
effect was observed in both response times and errors. The attentional control contrast was, if 
anything, in the “wrong direction.” Thus, there was strong evidence against for the 
contingency learning view, in addition to strong evidence against the conflict monitoring view 
(with Bayesian support for a true null). 
 
Figure 3.9. Experiment 1 dissociation analysis from Schmidt and Lemercier (2019) for 
response times (left) and percentage errors (right), including standard error bars. Only 
a contingency effect is observed. 
 It is also important to point out that the design of Experiment 1 departed in an 
important (and interesting) way from typical CSPC procedures. In particular, each font 
context was not consistently associated to one level of PC. For instance, Georgia font was 
mostly congruent for “brown” and “blue,” but mostly incongruent for “green” and “red,” in 
the Table 3.4 example. According to the compound-stimulus contingency learning view this 
design feature is irrelevant, as participants only learn word-font-colour correspondences. 
According to the attentional control view, however, it might be proposed that no CSPC effect 
should be observed at all if learning about conflict is fully specific to the font (i.e., both fonts 
have the same number of congruent and incongruent trials, averaged across the four words). 
However, a second experiment with a more “traditional” CSPC setup (i.e., one context 
consistently mostly congruent and the other consistently mostly incongruent) produced 
exactly the same results. Thus, our results were not only inconsistent with the conflict 
monitoring view of CSPC effects, but were also inconsistent with the idea that learning in the 
procedure is context-specific. Instead, learning seems to be related to word-colour-font 
compounds. 
Context-specific temporal learning 
 In other work (Schmidt, Lemercier, & De Houwer, 2014), we explored the possibility 
that at least some CSPC effects may be due to context-specific temporal learning. As 
described above regarding the temporal learning account of LLPC effects, congruency effects 
could be larger in a mostly congruent list relative to a mostly incongruent list simply because 
of the differing task paces in the two conditions. The same might be true of task contexts, 
whereby participants learn to time their responses differently in one context than another. In 
that vein, we used the proportion easy manipulation described earlier (i.e., with high vs. low 
contrast letters), but manipulated “proportion easy” for two context locations. We observed 
larger stimulus contrast effects in the mostly easy location (e.g., up) relative to the mostly 
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hard location (e.g., down). Context-specific contingency learning could, in principle, not only 
account for CSPC effects for manipulated (contingency-biased) items, but also for non-
manipulated transfer items (e.g., Crump, Brosowsky, & Milliken, 2017; Crump & Milliken, 
2009; but for failures to replicate transfer, see Hutcheon & Spieler, 2017). It is noteworthy, 
however, that the failure to observe CSPC effects in Schmidt and Lemercier (2019) after 
controlling for contingency biases is just as inconsistent with a temporal learning account as 
with an attentional control account. I have also presented neural network demonstrations of 
how contingency and temporal learning biases can produce CSPC effects (see Chapter 4). 
Binding and other confounds in the CSE 
 In Schmidt and De Houwer (2011), we explored binding and contingency learning 
biases in the CSE. The assumption behind the CSE as a measure of attentional control is that 
the effect emerges because participants adjust attentional control in response to conflict 
during response selection. Following an incongruent trial, control is high and the congruency 
effect is resultantly reduced. Following a congruent trial, control is lower and the word 
resultantly interferes more. However, there have been a number of confounds identified in 
this domain that bring into question the attentional control (or conflict monitoring) 
interpretation of the effect. One such bias comes from binding confounds (Hommel, Proctor, 
& Vu, 2004; Mayr, Awh, & Laurey, 2003). In particular, the series of stimulus repetition 
types systematically confounds the CSE. For example, it is only possible to have a “complete 
repetition” (i.e., same word and same colour) on a congruent trial following a congruent trial 
or on an incongruent trial following an incongruent trial. A complete repetition (which is 
responded to very fast) is never possible when congruency changes. We further identified 
sequential contingency confounds (for followup work, see Mordkoff, 2012), as congruent 
trials (on the current and/or previous trial) are always high contingency if words are presented 
most often in their congruent colour. In Stroop and flanker experiments with no contingency 
bias, we presented a “binding decomposition” of the CSE. As can be observed in Table 3.5, 
within each of the four cells of the CSE interaction, there are different types of feature 
repetitions possible. When restricting the analyses to the “complete alternations” (where no 
features repeat), there is no remaining CSE. Similar results were observed with the flanker 
task (i.e., target letter, instead of colour, with distracting flanking letters, instead of words) in 
a second experiment. 
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Table 3.5. Trial type examples with response times and errors from Schmidt and 
De Houwer (2011). 
Trial Type 
Repetition type 
RT Error rate 
W–W C–C W–C C–W 
Congruent–congruent       
  (1) BLUEblue→REDred     702 ms 8.3% 
  (2) BLUEblue→BLUEblue x x x x 494 ms 3.8% 
Congruent–incongruent       
  (3) BLUEblue→REDgreen     787 ms 16.7% 
  (4) BLUEblue→BLUEred x   x 749 ms 16.0% 
  (5) BLUEblue→REDblue  x x  570 ms 10.7% 
Incongruent–congruent       
  (6) REDblue→GREENgreen     702 ms 10.2% 
  (7) REDblue→REDred x  x  696 ms 11.9% 
  (8) REDblue→BLUEblue  x  x 559 ms 4.4% 
Incongruent–incongruent       
  (9) REDblue→GREENyellow     785 ms 14.2% 
  (10) REDblue→REDgreen x    754 ms 13.5% 
  (11) REDblue→GREENblue  x   571 ms 8.6% 
  (12) REDblue→REDblue x x   520 ms 5.2% 
  (13) REDblue→GREENred   x  773 ms 14.5% 
  (14) REDblue→BLUEgreen    x 755 ms 12.1% 
  (15) REDblue→BLUEred   x x 759 ms 12.7% 
Notes: Word indicated in all caps, colour in subscript. W–W=word–word; C–
C=colour–colour; W–C=word–colour; C–W=colour–word. The conditions in bold 
and italics do not contain repetitions. 
Modelling binding biases with factor nesting 
 One downside with assessing the CSE by only analysing complete alternation trials is 
that one must delete a large portion of the observations. One alternative method to 
“removing” binding biases from CSE designs was suggested by Notebaert and Verguts 
(2007). This involved coding for some of the binding confounds as variables that are inserted 
in a regression along with previous and current trial congruency. That is, we test for the main 
effects of congruency and previous trial congruency along with their interaction (CSE) while 
also controlling for various binding types (e.g., word repetitions) occurring on individual 
trials. The hope, then, is that the binding confounds are “regressed out” of the data and the 
CSE factor will only code for the “true” attentional control effect. 
 Unfortunately, this approach does not work well. In Schmidt, De Schryver, and 
Weissman (2014) we showed that this regression approach deals inadequately with a factor 
“nesting” problem. In short, one cannot account for all types of bindings (e.g., word-word 
repetitions, colour-colour repetitions, word-colour repetitions, and colour-word repetitions) 
and all of their interactions (and orthogonal to congruency and previous trial congruency), 
because there are far too many missing cells. For example, if the current trial is congruent and 
the current colour (e.g., blue) is the same as the previous trial word (i.e., “blue”), then it is 
impossible that the word has not repeated. This means that we simply cannot code for all 
potential binding influences on the data (as the number of factors would greatly exceed the 
number of data points). The variance in the CSE that we do not model (omitted factors) can 
be “stolen” by the CSE interaction, giving the illusion that a CSE exists independent of 
binding effects even if this is untrue. This is termed omitted variable bias. We demonstrated 
that this bias does exist and suggested that the only appropriate way to assess the CSE is to 
discard feature repetitions and restrict the analysis to complete alternation trials. 
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Further CSE concerns 
 In one paper, Blais, Stefanidi, and Brewer (2014) contested the notion the contingency 
and/or congruency switch biases influence the CSE (as discussed in Schmidt & De Houwer, 
2011). Eschewing discussion of congruency switch biases, the notion of a contingency bias in 
the CSE is that we should expect that the CSE interaction should emerge when distracting 
stimuli are presented most often in the congruent colour. This is because congruency (and 
previous trial congruency) becomes conflated with contingency and contingency effects are 
larger following a predictive, high contingency stimulus (Hazeltine & Mordkoff, 2014; 
Schmidt et al., 2007). Blais and colleagues argued against such a contingency bias based on 
the finding that the CSE did not (significantly) increase with a higher proportion of congruent 
trials (and therefore higher contingency). In Schmidt (2014b), however, I demonstrated that 
their data was severely underpowered and that the observed trend in their data was very 
strongly consistent with the learning view of the CSE, as illustrated in Figure 3.10. In 
particular, the observed CSE did increase notably as the PC (and thus contingency) increased 
(solid line), but the sample was so small that this did not come out as significant. Their study 
only had enough power to detect an influence of contingency on the CSE if said effect was 
enormous in magnitude (dashed line). Strangely, the same slope was significantly positive in 
their error data, but seemingly ignored. 
 
Figure 3.10. Congruence sequence effect as a function of proportion congruency in Blais, and 
colleagues (2014) as reanalyzed by Schmidt (2014b), with observed trend line (solid 
line) and trend line that would have been required for a high power test given the 
sample size and error (dashed line). 
Improved CSE design 
 In another report, we introduced a method for eliminating the above-mentioned 
contingency and binding biases by design (Schmidt & Weissman, 2014). In particular, instead 
of running an experiment and then deleting the majority of observations to assess only 
complete alternations, one can devise an experiment in which feature repetitions never occur 
to start out with. We achieved this by alternating (i.e., on odd and even trials) between two 
stimulus sets. For example, left- and right-pointing arrows can be presented on odd trials and 
up- and down-pointing arrows can be presented on even trials. Thus, congruency can repeat or 
change from one trial to the next (as usual), but it is impossible that any of the stimuli repeat 
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from one trial to the next. Additionally, we can have an equal number of congruent and 
incongruent trials without inducing a contingency bias (i.e., because we alternate between two 
two-choice tasks). In these studies, we observed robust CSEs for both an arrow version of 
prime-probe (i.e., with distracting and target arrows) in addition to a direction word version of 
the same paradigm (as described for the LLPC earlier). 
 Interestingly, however, we also observed in a follow-up report that the presence of 
these highly robust CSEs depends in a major way on the similarity between targets and 
distracters (Schmidt & Weissman, 2015). In a first experiment, some participants were 
presented either with arrows as distracters and direction words as targets or the reverse 
(different format). Yet other participants were presented with either direction words or with 
arrows as both targets and distracters (similar format). The results are presented in Figure 
3.11. As can be observed, congruency effects are observed in both cases, but the CSE is only 
observed with similar format distracters. 
 
Figure 3.11. Mean RT in each of the main conditions of Experiment 1 in Schmidt and 
Weissman (2015). 
 In a second experiment, we explored the reason for this format effect. It could, on the 
one hand, be that the mechanism responsible for the CSE (whatever that might be) is 
dependent on attentional capture of the distracting stimulus. When the distracter is the same 
perceptual format as the targets, it captures attention (i.e., because it looks like a potential 
target). On the other hand, it could simply be the case that the CSE is driven by perceptual 
conflict. With same format stimuli, the distracter and target either perceptually match (e.g., 
two left pointing arrows) or mismatch (e.g., one left and one right pointing arrow). With 
different format stimuli, the distracter and target always mismatch visually (e.g., a left-
pointing arrow and the word “left” mismatch visually, even though congruent in meaning). To 
test these two notions, we randomly varied the perceptual format (word, arrow) of both the 
distracter and the target on a trial-by-trial basis. Since the target in each trial could be either 
an arrow or a word, participants had to adopt an attentional set for both perceptual formats. 
According to the attentional capture account, distracters in both perceptual formats should 
capture attention, because both formats are goal-relevant. This account therefore predicts 
equivalent CSEs on both same and different perceptual format trials. According to the 
perceptual conflict account, the degree to which incongruent stimuli engender greater 
perceptual conflict than congruent stimuli should always be greater when those stimuli are 
presented in the same as compared to different perceptual formats. This account therefore 
predicts a larger congruency effect on same perceptual format trials than on the different 
perceptual format trials. It therefore also predicts larger CSEs following trials in which the 
distracter and target appear in the same as compared to different perceptual formats. The 
results are presented in Figure 3.12. As can be observed, the attentional capture account was 
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supported, with equivalent CSEs in both conditions. As observed in Figure 3.13, this was also 
true when considering the perceptual format of the preceding trial. 
 
Figure 3.12. Mean RT in each of the main conditions of Experiment 2 in Schmidt and 
Weissman (2015). 
 
Figure 3.13. Mean RT in each of the main conditions of Experiment 2 in Schmidt and 
Weissman (2015) as a function of previous trial perceptual format. 
 Interestingly, our new procedure does allow one to observe a CSE even when 
binding/learning confounds are excluded. However, subsequent work (by others) does not 
support well the idea that this CSE is due to conflict monitoring. For instance, the size of the 
CSE is largely unrelated to the size of the congruency effect, which it should be if amount of 
conflict determines the CSE, and the congruency effect can even reverse after incongruent 
trials with some manipulations, which should never be the case according to the attentional 
control view (Weissman, Colter, Drake, & Morgan, 2015; Weissman, Egner, Hawks, & Link, 
2015; Weissman, Hawks, & Egner, 2016; Weissman, Jiang, & Egner, 2014). 
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Works in Progress and Future Directions 
Temporal learning defense 
 In Schmidt (2019), I respond to a recent critique of the temporal learning account from 
Cohen-Shikora, Suh, and Bugg (in press). As mentioned above, one of the many lines of 
converging evidence for a temporal learning bias in the LLPC effect comes from statistical 
modelling. In particular, in addition to the standard autocorrelation in response times, it was 
observed that (a) faster previous-trial response times are associated with larger congruency 
effects on the current trial, and (b) controlling for previous trial influences decreases the 
LLPC effect. The LME analyses that I originally reported followed a standard procedure 
(copied exactly from Kinoshita et al., 2011) for analysing individual trial response times. 
Because response times are distributed in a heavily skewed (ex-Gaussian) fashion, performing 
an LME on raw response times will violate the distributional assumptions of the test. A 
typical procedure is therefore to transform raw response times, usually with an inverse 
transform (such as −1000/RT), or with a log or Gamma transform (e.g., Andrews & Lo, 2012; 
Kinoshita et al., 2011; Kliegl, Masson, & Richter, 2009; Masson & Kliegl, 2013). 
 Cohen-Shikora and colleagues (in press) took issue with the transformation of raw 
response times. There are scenarios in which transforming data might be undesirable 
(Stevens, 1946), such as when assessing additivity of two main effects (Balota, 
Aschenbrenner, & Yap, 2013; Lo & Andrews, 2015). They therefore used a generalized linear 
mixed model (GLMM) on raw response times and modeled the skew (with a Gamma 
distribution and identity link function) and reproduced the LME and GLMM analyses on 
three datasets. Although the exact same findings were observed in all datasets with LME (i.e., 
consistent with the temporal learning account), results with GLMM were inconsistent. 
Combined with some additional analyses, the authors argued that a temporal learning 
contribution to the LLPC effect is not well supported. 
 In my response article, I highlight several important problems with the claims of 
Cohen-Shikora and colleagues (in press). For instance, I point out that the concerns that can 
exist with data transformations are not applicable to crossover-type interactions (Loftus, 
1978), as in the case of the LLPC effect, or a simple main effect (Kliegl et al., 2009). I also 
demonstrate that the relationship between previous-trial response times and current-trial 
response times is better described in an inverse (not raw) scale. With this, I provide a clear 
demonstration of why analyses on the inverse scale (with LME) and raw scale (with GLMM) 
seem to provide incompatible results. Indeed, if a true temporal learning effect does not exist, 
then it should not appear in the inverse or raw scales, so the robust effects in the inverse scale 
remain inconsistent with the null temporal learning view. I further demonstrate that a 
temporal learning bias is observed in the raw scale if previous-trial response times are allowed 
to predict current-trial response times in a non-linear (inverse) scale. In short, the paper 
demonstrates that the challenge to the temporal learning account was unwarranted. 
Consensus paper 
 I am also a coauthor on a paper that outlines a general consensus on the more optimal 
ways to assess adaptive control while eliminating (or at least reducing) other types of biases 
(Braem et al., 2019). In this paper, we consider approaches to studying adaptive control in 
LLPC, ISPC, CSPC, and CSE procedures. The main aim of the paper is to highlight the 
various limitations of approaches in these paradigms and the best ways of dealing with 
confounds. More concretely, we propose that control is best assessed by manipulating some 
items and testing for transfer to unbiased (non-manipulated items). The global goal is to 
provide readers with a “user guide” for attentional control paradigms, which is useful for 
those wanting to study adaptive control but who are less intimately familiar with the 
intricacies of the work in the domain. 
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 This work is particularly important given how extensively “attentional control” 
procedures have been applied to a variety of clinical, development, and individual differences 
populations (E. Abrahamse et al., 2017; Bugg, 2014b; Hutchison, 2011; Iani, Stella, & 
Rubichi, 2014; Lansbergen, Kenemans, & van Engeland, 2007; Lansbergen, van Hell, & 
Kenemans, 2007; Liu, Gehring, Weissman, Taylor, & Fitzgerald, 2012; Praamstra & Plat, 
2001; Steudte-Schmiedgen et al., 2014; Tulek, Atalay, Kanat, & Suerdem, 2013). The 
standard logic has been that if a PC effect or CSE is found to be diminished in a given 
population (e.g., Parkinson’s patients), then this indicates an impairment in attentional 
control. Unfortunately, however, proponents from both sides of the control vs. learning debate 
strongly agree that the wrong versions of these paradigms have been systematically used. That 
is, more applied researchers have consistently used versions of these paradigms that are 
known to be heavily confounded by simple learning biases, rather than using more 
“confound-minimized” designs. Similar concerns exist in neuroscience work with these 
paradigms (Blais & Bunge, 2010; Botvinick et al., 1999; Kerns et al., 2004; MacDonald, 
Cohen, Stenger, & Carter, 2000; Sheth et al., 2012). Further consensus-based experimental 
research is currently being planned with the same author group. 
Chapter 4 – Neural Networks  72 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 4 – Neural Networks 
  
Chapter 4 – Neural Networks  73 
Published Work 
Parallel Episodic Processing (PEP) model 
 I have also conducted neural network research, primarily with exemplar based models 
of memory. In particular, I programmed the Parallel Episodic Processing (PEP) model 
(Schmidt, 2013a, 2013c, 2016a, 2016b, 2018; Schmidt et al., 2017; Schmidt et al., 2016; 
Schmidt & Weissman, 2016). In this and related exemplar (also known as episodic or 
instance) models (Hintzman, 1984, 1986, 1988; Logan, 1988; Medin & Schaffer, 1978; 
Nosofsky, 1988a, 1988b), each experienced event (e.g., trial in an experiment) is stored as a 
new memory trace. That is, on each trial, the stimulus (or stimuli) that were experienced and 
the response that was selected are coded into a new memory trace. For instance, if a 
participant sees a blue stimulus on 50 trials and presses the J key each time (e.g., in 
accordance with instructions), then there will be 50 memory traces linking blue to the J key. 
When a stimulus is presented, retrieval of similar memory traces will occur. For example, if 
blue is presented again, then memories of seeing a blue stimulus will be retrieved, which will 
in turn reactivate the responses that were made on these past trials. Using these simple 
memory storage and retrieval processes, we have been showing over a series of papers how a 
broad range of findings from various sub-literatures can be accounted for. As much of what 
has been simulated in the PEP model has been discussed in the prior two chapters, some 
redundancy is avoided in this chapter by assuming that the reader is either familiar with the 
research domain in question or has read Chapters 2 and 3. 
 A visual depiction of the PEP model is presented in Figure 4.1, as applied to a simple 
Stroop task. There are input nodes for each stimulus that can be “presented” to the model, 
identity (or decision) nodes that represent the internal classification of the stimulus, and 
response nodes for each potential response a participant can make (in this example, key 
presses). More critical is the episodic store. After each trial, a new episode is created that 
links to the stimuli and responses that were active on the trial. In later versions of the model, 
also decisions and goals are encoded in memory traces. On subsequent trials, memory traces 
are “retrieved” when they become active via activation sent from input or other nodes. For 
instance, if the red input node becomes active, then it will send activation to episodes that 
coded for red. This, in turn, leads to retrieval activation for the other nodes encoded in the 
memory traces (e.g., activation of linked responses). Although further details of the model 
will be discussed below, the key concept is that events are encoded into memory traces, and 
that these traces can be retrieved to influence responding. The localist event encoding (i.e., 
one trace per event) should be regarded as conceptual only, and need not be viewed as 
implying that the underlying “code” in neurons and synapses in the brain is so locally 
organised. 
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Figure 4.1. A representation of the Parallel Episodic Processing (PEP) model. Input nodes 
feed activation through Identity nodes and Response nodes in an algorithmic route. 
Learning occurs via Episode nodes, which encode the stimuli and response for each 
trial. 
Skill acquisition 
 I have applied the PEP model widely to a diverse range of domains. First, consider 
skill acquisition. When performing a novel task, performance tends to follow a predictable 
practice curve. This has often been referred to as the power law of practice, as participant-
averaged, blocked data fits a power curve, whereby performance rapidly improves early on, 
then continues to improve at ever diminishing rates toward asymptote (Logan, 1988; Newell 
& Rosenbloom, 1981), though the curve better fits an exponential decay function in 
individual-trial, within-participant analyses (Heathcote, Brown, & Mewhort, 2000; Myung, 
Kim, & Pitt, 2000). The reason for this shape is simple: with a novel task, we are initially 
quite slow. With a small amount of practice, we can speed up greatly. However, the more and 
more we have practiced, the less and less it is possible to speed up even more (e.g., if after 
some amount of practice we halve our performance from 1000 ms per trial to 500 ms it is 
impossible to speed up another 500 ms). The gains from further practice are therefore smaller 
and smaller the more and more we have already improved. 
 The PEP model produces practice curves for a simple reason: the more and more 
exemplars there are linking a given stimulus (e.g., blue) to a given response (e.g., J key) the 
faster and faster the appropriate response can be retrieved (this differs a bit from the practice 
simulations of Logan, 1988, where memory traces race and the winning trace determines the 
response). Figure 4.2 shows simulated data from a Stroop experiment (Schmidt et al., 2016). 
As can be observed, incongruent, congruent, and neutral trials all improve with practice, and 
this follows a simple practice curve. Incidentally, these data also illustrate why many effects, 
such as the Stroop effect here, decrease with extra practice: as performance improves toward 
asymptote with extended practice, initially slow trial types (e.g., incongruent trials) stand to 
benefit more from practice than initially fast trial types (e.g., congruent trials). Thus, the 
model not only explains practice curves, but also (and for the same reason) why Stroop effects 
decrease with practice (Dulaney & Rogers, 1994; Ellis & Dulaney, 1991; MacLeod, 1998; 
Simon, Craft, & Webster, 1973; Stroop, 1935). 
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Figure 4.2. PEP-simulated practice curves of a Stroop task from Schmidt and colleagues 
(2016), Simulation 1. 
Contingency learning 
 For essentially an identical reason, the PEP model also learns contingencies. For 
instance, in the colour-word contingency learning paradigm (discussed in the Chapter 2 on 
contingency learning) neutral distracting words are predictive of the likely colour response. 
Participants respond faster to high contingency trials relative to low contingency trials. This 
is, in the model, due to exactly the same storage and retrieval processes that produce practice 
curves. In particular, each time that a distracting stimulus (e.g., “move”) is presented and 
linked with a response to the target colour (e.g., the key for blue), there will be a new trace 
linking the word to the response. If “move” is presented most often in blue, then most “move” 
memories will be linked to a blue response. Thus, presentation of “move” to the network will 
bias a blue response via memory retrieval. As such, retrieval of the high contingency response 
is faster than retrieval of a low contingency response. The model not only simulates the 
simple two-condition difference between high and low contingency trials, but also simulates a 
range of findings from the learning domain. 
 First, we observed that the model produces the rapid acquisition curves that we 
observe in the colour-word contingency learning procedure. As illustrated in Figure 4.3, there 
is an initial practice curve in the practice phase (where only colours are presented). In the 
learning phase (where predictive words are presented in colours), learning is extremely rapid 
in both the PEP model and in the participant data. Contingency effects do increase slightly 
with continued training, but learning effects are observed almost immediately from the start of 
training. 
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Figure 4.3. Simulation 2 cycle times from Schmidt and colleagues (2016) of initial practice 
trials (left) and the following high and low contingency trials across (right) across 
training blocks, with original data (Schmidt & De Houwer, 2016b, Experiment 2). 
 In Simulations 4 and 5 of the same paper, we simulated the two experiments from 
Schmidt and De Houwer (2016a) assessing facilitative effects of contingencies (discussed in 
the item frequency section of Chapter 2). The results of Simulation 4 are presented in Figure 
4.4. As can be observed, the model produces the fastest responses for the highest-frequency 
pairings of stimuli (high contingency), the slowest responses for the lowest-frequency 
pairings (low contingency), and intermediate response times to the three types of medium 
contingency trials (see Chapter 2). The results of Simulation 5 are presented in Figure 4.5. 
Again, the model produces a similar pattern of means as in the participant data: fastest 
responses to high contingency items, intermediate response times to low contingency items, 
and the slowest performance to once-presented novel-word trials. 
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Figure 4.4. Simulation 3 cycle times from Schmidt and colleagues (2016) of high 
contingency, low contingency, and three types of medium contingency trials, with 
original data (Schmidt & De Houwer, 2016a, Experiment 1). 
 
Figure 4.5. Simulation 4 cycle times from Schmidt and colleagues (2016) of high and low 
contingency trials during training (left) and high contingency, low contingency, and 
novel word trials during test (right), with original data (Schmidt & De Houwer, 2016a, 
Experiment 2). 
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 In a subsequent paper (Schmidt, 2018), I modelled findings from a report of Forrin 
and MacLeod (2017). In their experiments, they assessed asymmetries in colour-word 
contingency learning effects across different response modalities (word reading, colour 
naming, and key press) and across differing stimulus onset asynchronies. Their main 
motivation was to assess a “horserace” model of colour-word contingency learning effects, 
similar to related ideas that had previously been considered (and discarded) in the Stroop 
literature (Dunbar & MacLeod, 1984; Dyer, 1973; Klein, 1964; Morton & Chambers, 1973; 
Palef & Olson, 1975; Warren, 1972). The notion, illustrated in Figure 4.6, is that words are 
read faster than colours are named, such that contingencies associated with distracting words 
should influence colour identification to a greater extent than contingencies associated with 
distracting colours should influence word identification. With verbal responding, this was 
observed, with contingency effects larger in colour naming than in word reading. However, 
the same asymmetry was not observed in manual, key press responses. The authors were also 
able to “reverse” the verbal asymmetry by presenting colours in advance of words. The 
horserace notion is that giving the “slower” dimension (colour) a “head start” should allow 
the colour to have more influence on words. 
 
Figure 4.6. A simple horserace model as it applies to contingency learning paradigms. The 
“word horse” runs faster to the response “finish line” (checkered) than the “colour 
horse,” producing an asymmetry in the magnitude of colour and word identification 
contingency effects. 
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 In my response article, I considered a slightly modified version of the horserace 
model, illustrated in Figure 4.7. Although true that past work has shown that word reading is 
faster than colour naming (Cattell, 1886; Fraisse, 1969), this does not mean that word stimuli 
are processed faster than colour stimuli (Melara & Algom, 2003). Rather, the time between 
stimulus presentation and verbalisation is faster for words than for colours. If we consider 
stimulus identification and the translation (Sugg & McDonald, 1994; Virzi & Egeth, 1985) of 
that identified stimulus to a vocal response as two different things, then it may actually be the 
case that words are not (visually) processed especially fast, but only that the identified word 
can be rapidly converted to a vocal output. That is, word (lexical) to pronunciation is much 
more direct than the path from a colour representation (e.g., pictorial) to the appropriate 
colour label pronunciation. Indeed, reading words is much more heavily practiced than 
naming colours. Indeed, word detection does not seem to be especially fast (Fraisse, 1969). 
Thus, I proposed that the advantage that words have over colours with a vocal response 
(reading/naming) is not a benefit in stimulus-processing speed but a benefit in the 
compatibility between targets and responses (i.e., response-selection speed), inspired by the 
dimensional-overlap model (Kornblum, Hasbroucq, & Osman, 1984; Kornblum & Lee, 1995; 
Kornblum, Stevens, Whipple, & Requin, 1999; Zhang & Kornblum, 1998; Zhang, Zhang, & 
Kornblum, 1999). 
 
Figure 4.7. An expanded horserace model as it applies to colour-naming and word-reading 
contingency learning paradigms. Most critically, it is unclear why words should 
influence colour naming at a particularly strong rate when the word is not a potential 
response (i.e., why C in the top panel should be stronger than D in the bottom panel, 
indicated as learned connections). 
 In one simulation, I showed that the size of the contingency effect should be 
determined by how automatic the target can be translated into a response, as illustrated in 
Figure 4.8. When less automatic (small decision-response weighting in the figure), responding 
should be slow and a contingency for the task-irrelevant dimension should have more time to 
influence responding, thereby producing a large contingency effect. This will be the case for 
both colour and word identification with key presses, because colour-to-key and word-to-key 
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mappings are novel. This also explains why there is no asymmetry in key press responses. 
However, in verbal tasks, word reading is more automatic than colour naming, so the 
contingency effect should be smaller for the former case relative to the latter. In a second 
simulation, it was further shown that this asymmetry can reverse if the colour is presented in 
advance of the word, as illustrated in Figure 4.9. The reason for this, of course, is similar to 
what Forrin and MacLeod (2017) propose: the word gets less time to influence colour naming 
and the colour gets more time to influence word reading. 
 
Figure 4.8. Simulation 1 cycle times from Schmidt (2018) for high-contingency and low-
contingency trials as a function of overtrained decision-response weightings. 
 
Figure 4.9. Simulation 2 contingency effect from Schmidt (2018) as a function of colour 
preview and target dimension. 
Stimulus-response binding 
 Within the memory store of the PEP model, there is a retrieval-induced decay 
mechanism. In short, recently-encoded memories are more strongly retrievable than older 
memories. What this means is that events that were encountered recently have more influence 
on behaviour than older events. This is simply a normal product of a learning rate, as would 
also be present in other types of models. For instance, each time that weights are updated in a 
distributed store, learning based on older events are effectively weakened when encoding 
something new (even too strongly, as indicated by catastrophic forgetting; see French, 1999). 
This property of the model means that performance is influenced particularly strongly by just-
encountered bindings. As a result, the model can simulate stimulus-response binding effects 
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(Schmidt et al., 2016). For instance, as discussed in Chapter 2, in the distracter-response 
binding literature (Frings et al., 2007) it is observed that there is a distracter repetition benefit 
when the same response is required as in the immediately-preceding trial. For instance, if a 
participant just saw “K” as a flanker to the target letter “J,” the participant will be faster on the 
current trial to respond to a “J” target again if the distracter is (again) “K” relative to if a new 
distracter (e.g., “D”) is presented. In contrast, if a new target is presented (e.g., “F”) then there 
is a small distracter repetition cost. This full pattern of behaviour is accounted for by the PEP 
model. In particular, if one just responded to a trial with a “K” flanker by pressing the “J” key 
(i.e., to the target “J”), then presentation of “K” again as a distracter will bias another “J” 
response. This will help if the response does need to repeat, but will harm performance 
slightly if a new response is required. Simulated data are presented in Figure 4.10. 
  
Figure 4.10. Simulated distracter-response binding effect from Schmidt and colleagues 
(2016). 
Rhythmic timing 
 The PEP model also simulates rhythmic timing processes. As currently implemented 
(although this is currently undergoing revision), the model stores timing information in each 
exemplar. More precisely, the model stores how long it took to respond to a given stimulus 
(i.e., response time). Using this information at retrieval, the model anticipates when to 
respond, not merely what to respond. This allows the model to simulate rhythmic timing (i.e., 
autocorrelated response times), which is ubiquitous in cognitive paradigms (Gilden, Thornton, 
& Mallon, 1995; Gilden, 1997, 2001). Using this mechanism, the model was able to simulate 
mixing costs (Los, 1994, 1996, 1999b, 1999a; Lupker et al., 1997; Van Duren & Sanders, 
1988), the observation that response speed to easy (normal target) and hard (degraded target) 
items are both slowed (but especially to easy items) when easy and hard items are intermixed 
in one procedure (relative to when only easy or only hard stimuli are presented). The data are 
presented in Figure 4.11. 
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Figure 4.11. Simulated mixing cost (left) with participant data (right) from Schmidt and 
colleagues (2016). 
Attentional control paradigms 
 Using the same model, I have shown how the simple memory encoding and retrieval 
processes discussed above can also explain behaviour in a range of so-called attentional 
control paradigms. As discussed in Chapter 3 on attentional control, I have frequently argued 
that many measures of conflict monitoring, such as proportion congruent (PC) and 
congruency sequence effects (CSE), are explainable in terms of simple learning biases. In 
addition to experimental work aimed at dissociating learning “confounds” from true 
attentional control effects, I have also used the PEP model to demonstrate why observed 
results in the attentional control domain may have little to do with attentional control at all. 
That is, it is shown how the PEP model can reproduce key findings even though the model 
does not monitor conflict or control attention at all. Given extensive discussion of most of the 
modelled phenomena in Chapter 3, I present only a brief summary of the PEP simulations 
below. 
 In Schmidt (2013a), I showed that stimulus-response contingency learning can explain 
the item-specific PC effect. In particular, the PEP model does not have a conflict monitor and 
does not adjust attention in response to conflict. However, the model does learn 
contingencies. Words that are mostly congruent are predictive of the congruent response (e.g., 
because “blue” is presented most often in blue). This speeds congruent trials, inflating the 
congruency effect. In contrast, words that are mostly incongruent are (depending on the 
manipulation) predictive of an incongruent response (e.g., because “green” is presented most 
often in yellow). This speeds incongruent responses, thereby decreasing the congruency 
effect. The net result is a small congruency effect in the mostly incongruent condition, as 
illustrated in Figure 4.12. 
 
Figure 4.12. Simulation 1 cycle time data from Schmidt (2013a) with congruency as a 
function of (a) proportion congruency and (b) contingency. 
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 In Schmidt (2013c), I further showed that temporal learning biases can explain the list-
level PC effect. That is, list PC is manipulated with some (contingency biased) items and 
tested with some intermixed transfer items that are not contingency biased. The PC effect for 
the transfer items results from the faster task pace in the mostly congruent condition relative 
to the mostly incongruent condition, similar to the mixing cost explained above (see also 
Chapter 3 for more information). The simulated data are presented in Figure 4.13. 
 
Figure 4.13. Analysis 1 data from Schmidt (2013c) for congruency and proportion 
congruency. Model-simulated (A) cycle times and (B) error percentages of Hutchison 
(2011). 
 For a similar reason as why the same memory mechanism explains both contingency 
learning and binding, the model also predicts an influence of recent events on rhythmic 
timing. For this reason, the model predicts that congruency effect should be larger following 
(fast) congruent trials than following (slow) incongruent trials. In Schmidt and Weissman 
(2016), we showed that the PEP model therefore also simulates a CSE, even after controlling 
for contingency and binding confounds. Simulated data for a latter version of the model are 
presented in 4.14. 
 
Figure 4.14. Simulation 9 cycle times from Schmidt and colleagues (2016) for congruent and 
incongruent items following congruent and incongruent trials, with original data 
(Schmidt & Weissman, 2014, Experiment 1). 
 In Schmidt (2016b), I further investigated asymmetric list shifting effects. As 
described in a prior chapter, an asymmetric list shifting effect is the observation that the 
congruency effect diminishes more drastically when switching from a mostly congruent block 
of trials to a mostly incongruent block of trials relative to the increase in the congruency 
effect when switching from a mostly incongruent block to a mostly congruent block (E. L. 
Abrahamse, Duthoo, Notebaert, & Risko, 2013). As also described earlier, this effect is 
Chapter 4 – Neural Networks  84 
normally interpreted as evidence for attentional control, but can be better accounted for by a 
practice bias. Indeed, the PEP model also produces asymmetric list shifting effects due to the 
contingency and practice confounds discussed in Chapter 3. The results from the first of two 
simulations are presented in Figure 4.15. 
 
Figure 4.15. Experiment 1a (a) percentage errors and (b) model errors, and Experiment 1b (c) 
percentage errors and (d) model errors for Abrahamse and colleagues (2013) as 
modeled in Schmidt (2016b). MC = mostly congruent; MI = mostly incongruent. 
 In yet another modelling investigation (Schmidt, 2016a), I demonstrated that context-
specific proportion congruent effects can also be explained by simple contingency learning 
biases (as was later confirmed in experimental research; see Schmidt & Lemercier, 2019). The 
modelling results also indicated that transfer effects (Crump & Milliken, 2009; Crump et al., 
2017; cf., Hutcheon & Spieler, 2017, for failures to replicate transfer) can be explained by 
(context-specific) temporal learning. Interestingly, these modelling results for “context-
specific” PC effects require no added assumptions. The model simulates context-specific 
effects for exactly the same reason as for item-specific and list-level PC effects. 
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Works in Progress and Future Directions 
Task switching and instruction following 
 In currently ongoing research, we have been applying the PEP model to cued task 
switching and instruction following (Schmidt et al., 2017). We have been able to show that 
the PEP model is able to reproduce a broad range of key findings from the cued (and uncued) 
task switching domain, including the switch cost, task-rule congruency effects (and their 
asymmetry with task switch), response repetition effects (and their asymmetry with task 
switch), cue repetition benefits, and a full ten-condition binding decomposition of cued task 
switching (Schmidt & Liefooghe, 2016; see Chapter 5 for more information). 
Further applications to binding 
 So far, the PEP model has been applied directly to distracter-response binding 
paradigms, as described above, and indirectly to other phenomena, as in the task switching 
example above. However, a future goal is to apply the PEP model more widely to a range of 
findings within the binding and action control domains. This work will be carried out in the 
context of a German Research Foundation (DFG) grant spearheaded by Christian Frings. 
Action sequencing 
 Other research will aim to extend the PEP model beyond its current breadth to 
learning across sequences. The aim will be to simulate performance across a range of 
sequencing domains, such as implicit sequence learning, action sequencing, skilled typing, 
and music learning. The tentative solution to the “sequencing problem” that I will be 
exploring will also form a coherent account of event timing. 
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Published Work 
Notes 
 Some additional research that I have conducted over the years does not fit as neatly 
into one of the categories in the four preceding sections. Some of these other research lines 
also make up a relatively small percentage of my work and perhaps do not warrant an entire 
chapter on their own. As such, the present section presents some of my smaller research 
projects. This includes research on formal reasoning, temporal learning (outside of the 
attentional control domain; cf., Chapter 3), and cued task switching. 
Formal reasoning 
 I have published one paper, from work as an undergraduate student, on formal 
reasoning. Consider immediate inference and syllogistic reasoning tasks, illustrated in Figure 
5.1. In an immediate inference task, participants are given a single premise that they are asked 
to assume is true (e.g., “Some of the chemists are beekeepers”) and are then asked whether a 
given conclusion statement (e.g., “All of the chemists are beekeepers”) follows from this 
premise. A syllogistic reasoning task is similar, except that there are two premises. In the 
immediate inference example, the reasoner can decide “Yes” if the conclusion is necessarily 
true on the basis of the premise, “No” if the conclusion is necessarily false on the basis of the 
premise, or “Maybe” if the conclusion is neither necessarily true nor necessarily false (note 
that the distinction between “No” and “Maybe” is typically not considered in the philosophy 
of logic, both of which are simply considered “false”). Because “some” means “at least one 
and possibly all” in logic, this particular problem is indeterminate (i.e., “Maybe”). 
 
Figure 5.1. Example problems for the immediate inference and syllogistic reasoning tasks. 
Correct responses are indicated with a checkmark. Incorrect responses that seem to 
follow from a pragmatic interpretation of “some” are marked with a cross. 
 The reader may already notice a strange problem with this example. In everyday usage 
(pragmatics), “some” means something entirely different. We would normally interpret 
“some” as something like “some but not all” or “some are, but some are not.” Thus, “all” 
chemists definitely cannot be beekeepers if only “some” of the chemists are beekeepers, right? 
Well, according to formal logic rules, this can be true. Relatedly, if James tells Christelle 
“Some of the employees are part of the union,” then Christelle will likely infer that some 
employees are not part of the union (because only some of the employees are). Christelle 
IF IT IS TRUE THAT: 
   Some of the chemists are beekeepers  
THEN IS IT THE CASE THAT: 
   All of the chemists are beekeepers Y__ N__ M__  
   None of the chemists are beekeepers Y__ N__ M__  
   Some of the chemists are beekeepers Y__ N__ M__  
   Some of the chemists are not beekeepers Y__ N__ M__ 
 
 
IF IT IS TRUE THAT: 
   Some of the chemists are not beekeepers  
   All of the beekeepers are musicians  
THEN IS IT THE CASE THAT: 
   None of the musicians are chemists Y__ N__ M__  
   Some of the musicians are chemists Y__ N__ M__ 
 
 
Immediate Inference 
Syllogistic Reasoning 
✓  
✓ 
✓ 
✓  
 
 
✓ 
✓
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would reasonably assume that if James had meant “all,” then he would have said “all.” This is 
termed the Gricean maxim of quantity (or informativeness; Grice, 1975). Thus, some 
syllogistic reasoning “errors” may not be errors at all. Rather, the error may reflect a Gricean, 
rather than a logical, interpretation of the premises. 
 In the formal reasoning research domain, there are many developed models that 
attempt to explain the regularities in the errors that participants make when making logical 
inferences (Henle, 1962; Johnson-Laird, 2010). However, what we argued in Schmidt and 
Thompson (2008) is that a substantial proportion of the errors that participants make in formal 
reasoning tasks can actually be due to misunderstanding of the “logical” meaning of the word 
“some.” In logic, proper inferences can be inferred from the square of opposition, illustrated 
in Figure 5.2. However, we proposed that participants might instead represent the “moods” in 
a triangle of opposition, where “some” and “some...not” are treated as equivalent and both 
contrary (mutually exclusive from) “all” and “none.” Thus, for many problems (like the 
examples above), reasoners may actually be making appropriate inferences, but based on a 
misunderstanding of how they should interpret “some.” 
 
Figure 5.2. There are four moods in the square of opposition (left): (A) universal affirmative: 
“All of the As are Bs,” (E) universal negative: “None of the As are Bs,” (I) particular 
affirmative: “Some of the As are Bs,” and (O) particular negative: “Some of the As are 
not Bs.” However, participants might interpret premises in accordance with the three 
moods of a triangle of opposition, replacing I and O with (U) partition: “Some but not 
all of the As are Bs,” which is assumed to be equivalent pragmatically to “Some of the 
As are Bs” and “Some of the As are not Bs.” 
 To test this idea, we changed “some” to “at least one” in the problems, and reasoning 
errors were drastically reduced. More specifically, participants given the “some” quantifier 
responded in the way one would expect if they had interpreted “some” to mean “some, but not 
all,” whereas participants given the “at least one” quantifier responded in the “correct” way. 
In a first study, participants were given only positive premises (i.e., “assume the premise is 
true”) in an immediate inference task, with either standard (e.g., “some”), clarified (e.g., “at 
least one”), or “pragmatically-clarified” (e.g., “some but not all”) quantifiers. Performance on 
the critical problems was best with clarified quantifiers and worst with pragmatically-clarified 
quantifiers. In a second study, participants were given both positive and negative premises 
(e.g., “assume the premise is false”). Again, reasoning was largely consistent with the 
“logical” interpretation with “at least one” quantifiers and with the “pragmatic” interpretation 
with “some” quantifiers. A third study used a syllogistic reasoning task with similar results. 
The data from the third study are presented in Figure 5.3. The correct response for the key 
problems was “Maybe,” with some that pragmatically suggest a “No” response (pragmatically 
false) and others that suggest a “Yes” response (pragmatically true). There is certainly much 
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more to reasoning errors than just misinterpretation of quantifiers, but it can be observed that 
a large percentage of errors are accounted for by quantifier misinterpretation. 
 
Figure 5.3. Proportion of logical responses and 95% confidence intervals for pragmatically 
true and pragmatically false syllogisms as a function of premise type in Experiment 3 
from Schmidt and Thompson (2008). 
Temporal learning 
 I have conducted several experiments on temporal learning (rhythmic timing). Many 
of these were in the context of temporal learning “confounds” in measures of attentional 
control. These studies were discussed in Chapter 3 on attentional control. However, I have 
also done some work on timing that is less directly related to attentional control. In particular, 
I published a paper (Schmidt, 2016c) in which I explored whether rhythmic timing is 
impaired when response-stimulus intervals (RSIs) were variable. That is, we know that 
participants time their responses rhythmically (i.e., similar response times from one trial to the 
next), but might rhythmic timing be disrupted if the time between the end of one trial and the 
start of the next is randomly varied on a trial-by-trial basis? According to one hypothesis, one 
might propose that rhythmic timing is due to participants pressing keys at similar intervals. 
That is, participants might be learning to anticipate making a response relative to the time of 
the last response. If so, then random variations in the time between the end of one trial and the 
start of the next should impair rhythmic timing. This is illustrated in Figure 5.4. On the other 
hand, if participants are learning to time responses relative to stimulus onset, then changes to 
the RSI are irrelevant. 
 
Figure 5.4. Illustration of how RSI manipulations influence response-response and stimulus-
response intervals. Note that only the response-response intervals become inconsistent 
with variable intervals. 
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 The experiment used a similar “proportion easy” procedure as described earlier in 
Chapter 3. In particular, a given participant was either presented with mostly high contrast 
target digits or mostly low contrast. As before, the temporal learning prediction is that the 
contrast effect should be larger in the “mostly easy” condition relative to the “mostly hard” 
condition. Interestingly, the proportion easy effect was equally robust in response times both 
when the RSIs were kept constant and when they were variable, as illustrated in Figure 5.5. 
These results therefore suggest that rhythmic timing is planned relative to stimulus onset. 
Subsequent analyses further showed that proportion easy effects were influenced by task 
rhythms in the expected way, with shifts in the distribution of response times in the high and 
low contrast conditions within the skewness and kurtosis of the distributions that were 
different in the mostly easy and mostly hard conditions. 
 
 
Figure 5.5. Results from Schmidt (2016c). Response times (top) and error rates (bottom) with 
standard errors for the fixed interval (left) and variable interval (right) conditions. 
Cued task switching 
 In Chapter 3, it was explored how learning biases confound purported measures of 
attentional control. Another example of simple learning biases in tasks aiming to study 
executive control comes from the task switching domain (Jersild, 1927; for reviews, see 
Kiesel et al., 2010; Monsell, 2003; Vandierendonck, Liefooghe, & Verbruggen, 2010). 
Consider the cued task switching procedure. In one fairly typical version of this procedure, 
illustrated in Figure 5.6, participants are presented a digit from 1-9, excluding 5, on each trial 
and are asked to complete one of two tasks. On some trials, participants have to decide 
whether the digit is odd or even (parity). On other trials, they need to decide whether the digit 
is large (>5) or small (<5; magnitude). The colour of a cue informs participants which of two 
tasks to perform on a given trial. The typical finding is a switch cost, where performance is 
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substantially slower and less accurate when the task alternates (e.g., a parity decision after a 
magnitude decision) relative to when the task repeats (e.g., a parity decision after a parity 
decision). This switch cost is typically interpreted as an index of cognitive control over “task 
sets.” Though accounts vary slightly (Allport, Styles, & Hsieh, 1994; Meiran, 1996; Meiran, 
Kessler, & Adi-Japha, 2008; Rogers & Monsell, 1995; Yeung & Monsell, 2003a, 2003b), the 
central notion is that the cognitive system has to “reprogram” itself for a task switch, and this 
produces the switch cost. 
 
Figure 5.6. Typical cued task switching procedure. Participants have to either identify the 
parity or magnitude of a digit on the basis of a cue colour. 
 Contrary to this, we have recently shown that the majority of this switch cost is due to 
simple stimulus-response binding biases (Schmidt & Liefooghe, 2016). For instance, if the 
task repeats, then it is possible that the stimulus (e.g., 3), cue (e.g., blue), decision (e.g., 
“odd”), and required response (e.g., left key) all repeat from the immediately preceding trial. 
As such, performance can be fast and accurate simply because a memory of the just-encoded 
event can be re-retrieved, allowing for quick selection of the appropriate response. This sort 
of “complete repetition” is never possible on a task alternation. In fact, it can even be possible 
that participants are required to make a different response to the same stimulus on a task 
alternation (e.g., left key for “odd” and right key for “large” to 7), which causes significant 
interference in memory retrieval. Table 5.1 presents ten unique trial types that emerge out of 
this design from our Experiment 2. As can be observed, a sequence of two trials can vary 
considerably in what features of the task do or do not repeat from the prior trial. 
Table 5.1. Ten trial types in Experiment 2 of Schmidt and Liefooghe (2016). 
 Repetition Type 
Condition Task Cue Stimulus Conceptual Response Physical Response 
cue-RR ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
cue-AR ✓ ✓ ✗ ✓ ✓ 
cue-AA ✓ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ 
rep-RR ✓ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
rep-AR ✓ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓ 
rep-AA ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ 
alt-RR ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗ ✓ 
alt-RA ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗ ✗ 
alt-AR ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓ 
alt-AA ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ 
Chapter 5 – Other Research  92 
 Binding biases are not orthogonal to the main effect of task switching. In fact, binding 
biases like these systematically work to the favour of task repetitions and to the detriment of 
task switches. We can, however, separate these simple binding biases from “true” switch costs 
by assessing trials (for both task repetitions and switches) in which none of the elements of 
the task repeat (marked in grey in Table 5.1). With this method, we were able to show that the 
vast majority of the switch cost is due to these types of “binding” biases alone, and not to 
executive control processes. The data are presented in Figure 5.7. Similar findings were 
observed in a non-cued version of task switching in Experiment 1. 
 
Figure 5.7. Experiment 2 responses times in milliseconds (left) and percentage errors (right) 
with standard error bars from Experiment 2 of Schmidt and Liefooghe (2016). 
 In-progress modelling work (Schmidt et al., 2017) has also shown that a number of 
key findings from the task switching domain are a logical consequence of these binding biases 
(e.g., task rule congruency effects, asymmetric response repetition biases, etc.). In future 
research, I will experimentally explore which findings from the task switching domain can be 
explained by binding biases and which by control. 
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Works in Progress and Future Directions 
Musical Stroop 
 In another line of studies, I will explore a potential application of some of the 
contingency learning principles that I have studied over the years (see Chapter 2) to music 
training. In particular, the aim will be to develop a method to improve music scale acquisition. 
Initial work will begin with the musical Stroop task (Grégoire, Perruchet, & Poulin-
Charronnat, 2013, 2014a, 2014b; Grégoire et al., 2015), illustrated in Figure 5.8. In this task, 
participants are presented with a note on a musical scale on each trial. Inside the note is the 
name of a note (“do,” “re,” “mi,” etc.), and the task is to read the note name (i.e., ignoring the 
actual location of the note). Critically, the note name is either congruent with the actual note 
(e.g., “do” written in the note for “do”) or incongruent (e.g., “do” written in the note for 
“mi”). Participants with substantial musical training read the notes slower and with more 
errors on incongruent trials. That is, musically-trained participants simply cannot completely 
avoid translating the note location into the corresponding note name, similar to how it is 
difficult to avoid reading the word in the Stroop task (see Chapter 1). Of course, the musical 
Stroop effect indicates that, after substantial overtraining, note naming becomes automatized 
in musicians. 
 
Figure 5.8. Example congruent (left) and incongruent (right) musical Stroop trials. 
 Not surprisingly, non-musicians do not produce a musical Stroop effect. The note 
location does not influence their performance because they do not know the note names to 
begin with. Of course, if a novice musician wants to learn the music scale, they could do this 
the typical way by studying the scale on paper. However, we know that contingencies can be 
learned rapidly and implicitly in (non-musical) contingency learning procedures. The same 
might prove effective in music learning. To test this notion, I will use modified versions of the 
musical Stroop task in which I present notes most often (or always) with the correct note 
name written inside of it (i.e., only occasionally or never incorrect). I can then assess whether 
this leads to rapid note name learning in non-musicians. Based on non-musical learning 
results, it is unlikely that this will not work. I will further explore how amount of training, 
contingency proportions (e.g., 80% vs. 100% congruent), and type of training (musical Stroop 
vs. explicit training) influences the acquisition speed and persistence of acquired knowledge 
of the musical scale. Potentially, such training procedures could prove to be a useful 
supplement to traditional music scale learning. If so, I may further pursue development of a 
free-to-use learning app for novice musicians. 
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Teaching statement 
Past experience in teaching at university level 
 I find teaching to be a rewarding experience. Since the later years of my undergraduate 
studies, I have been involved in teaching (in addition to administration) in various capacities. 
Already as an undergraduate at the University of Saskatchewan, I worked as a teaching 
assistant, primarily for introductory psychology. In this role, I assisted with exam supervision, 
exam organization (head teaching assistant), and grading. I also served as a tutor during this 
period for advanced cognitive science. 
 During my Master’s and Ph.D. at the University of Waterloo I had even greater 
teaching responsibilities. I taught a weekly statistics tutorial (the complement to the lecture 
component of the course). In this position, I was responsible for preparing and giving lectures 
for a group of around 30 psychology students. In addition to strengthening key concepts in the 
companion course (i.e., reviewing), I provided sample statistical problems that I prepared 
each week for students that we worked through interactively. For both this and the variety of 
other courses I served as teaching assistant for, I had yet further responsibilities. My role 
included everything from creating exam questions, grading, proctoring exams, handling 
student emails, holding office hours for student questions, various administrative course tasks 
(e.g., coordination with the Office for Persons with Disabilities for students with special 
needs), organizing make-up exams, and managing other teaching assistants. I was also 
involved as a “teaching assistant” for the Honour’s thesis course. In this role, I served to 
oversee theses, and to assist students with statistics, methodology, and writing. I also gave 
guest lectures for a third year cognition course. 
 During my postdoc at Ghent University, I was more involved in administration (e.g., I 
managed the academic bibliography for the Department of Experimental Clinical and Health 
Psychology), but I was also involved in teaching duties. These duties included exam 
surveillance and organisation of exams for a variety of courses (e.g., learning, health, clinical, 
and developmental psychology). I also assisted in the grading of Master’s theses. Although I 
did not have the opportunity to supervise Master’s or Ph.D. students as a postdoc, I am 
currently “co-supervising” a Ph.D. student, Iva Šaban (Croatia), that I hired with my UBFC 
funds. I also supervised a stage student (Anna Jondot) and I am in the process of hiring a 
second Ph.D. student. I have only moved to France recently. Although technically not a 
requirement for my current post, I will likely give lectures in the coming year. I also gave a 
neural network modelling workshop in Trier in 2019. 
Teaching methodology at university level 
 I hold the view that it is important for an instructor to engage students in learning. I 
believe that it is not enough for the instructor to know the material well. It is crucial that an 
instructor is dynamic and open enough to motivate students to participate in class. The 
instructor must remain the leader of the class, but can also allow for dialogue with students. 
As such, I use a variety of teaching approaches. I seize any opportunity I can to connect the 
material to the lives of students or to pop culture. I also prefer to use interactive 
demonstrations whenever possible. For instance, the Stroop effect can be demonstrated by 
having students name coloured colour words. This is much more effective and visceral than 
simply explaining the phenomenon. Similarly, students can be polled for their solutions to the 
Monty Hall illusion before the correct answer is explained. The inevitable protests from 
students afterwards can facilitate the explanation of conditional probability. Taking 
inspiration from exceptional academic speakers, I also work to have a good slide deck with 
clear visualisations to supplement what I am saying. To me, this is critical for effective 
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communication. In contrast, reading pages of bullet-point text is boring to students and will 
not assist in student comprehension. 
 I also like to actively engage students with classroom “micro-experiments,” preferably 
in small working groups. As one example, a difficult concept like the standard normal 
distribution can be explained to students with dice. If each group of students averages a set 
number of die rolls, then it can be demonstrated how, across groups, the averages produce a 
normal distribution. Interactive examples like this provide a good starting point for explaining 
key concepts and also encourage interaction between students. Keeping the course interactive 
has another benefit. I believe that it is important to gauge how well students comprehend the 
foundational concepts in the course. As an instructor, student feedback helps to determine 
which concepts require more or less attention. It is therefore necessary to foster a classroom 
environment in which students feel comfortable expressing their thoughts on the material. 
Students should never be put on the spot in a way that makes them uncomfortable or anxious 
about being in class, but open questions to the class as a whole can foster feedback. For larger 
class sizes, modern technology can help with the same end. For instance, interactive polling 
with phone apps can be used as both mini “quizzes” to see whether students have understood 
the lecture and for micro survey experiments. 
 In the case of seminar courses, I also feel active student involvement is key. My 
preferred format involves assigning one to three articles per week for students to read. 
Afterwards, rather than having students simply listen to me lecture about these articles, I 
prefer a different approach. As long as the class size allows, I prefer to have students take 
turns as the weekly discussion leader. This achieves two goals. First, it helps to strengthen 
presentation skills, which become increasingly important over time in an academic career 
(and also for those leaving academia). Second, it encourages students to “dig deeper” into the 
material they present: one never learns more about material than when they need to teach it to 
another. In my preferred format, students will also prepare a weekly two-page summary and 
critique of the readings. I feel that this approach is useful, because it helps to motivate 
students to keep up with the literature assigned in the course. In addition, students enter the 
classroom prepared with useful ideas to contribute to the discussion. Relying exclusively on 
an end-of-term exam or paper, on the other hand, leaves room for student slacking (e.g., “I 
will read it later”). For student assessment in other course types, multiple choice is the easiest 
but least optimal approach. Thus, as long as class size permits, I always prefer written tests or 
papers. Both in academia and industry, writing skills are one of the most useful transferable 
skills, so I like to involve writing as much as possible in the course. 
 Regarding Ph.D. students, I believe that it is crucial to foster research independence as 
early as possible. Though thankfully not my experience as a Ph.D. student, I think that many 
young graduate students are used by principal investigators to collect data to further their own 
research agendas. To me, this is a suboptimal use of young, curious minds. As such, while I 
will certainly involve Ph.D. students in collaborative projects, my first goal with a young 
Ph.D. student will be to have them read as much as possible in a research domain with one 
key goal: “Tell me what you want to do.” The sooner that a Ph.D. student can answer this 
question and forge their own direction forward, the sooner they will escape the shadow of 
their supervisor. Throughout the course of the Ph.D., I feel it is important that the student 
maintains regular contact with me. This should include, at minimum, a weekly meeting to 
discuss current progress and regular active involvement in lab activities (e.g., attendance and 
participation lab meetings). 
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